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One River, Three Sovereigns:
Indian and Interstate Water Rights
A. Dan Tarlock*
FederalIndian reserved waters apply to intra and interstate
streams and aquifers. Many interstatestreams have been allocated
among riparianstates by Supreme Court decree, interstate compact or congressionalapportionment,but Indian waterrights are
seldom well integratedinto these mass allocations.In Arizona v.
California, the Supreme Court held that in the case of a congressional apportionmentIndian water rights are chargedagainstthe
share of the state in which the reservation is located. States on
over-appropriatedrivers resistthe generalapplicationof this principle, but states with surplus waters view the recognition of
generous water rights as a way to protect base flows against the
claims of other states. This article argues that it is fair to charge
the satisfaction of reserved water rights against the state or states
in which the reservation is located because Indian tribes are quasisovereign. This is the practice of Western states in negotiating
reserve rights agreementsand is leaning to fairertreatment of the
tribes.
© Copyright 1987, University of Wyoming. See copyright notice at the beginning of
this issue.
* Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965 Stanford
University. Support for the research and writing of this article was provided by the Marshall T. Ewell Fund of the Chicago-Kent College of Law. I thank Professors David Getches
of the University of Colorado and Helen Ingram of the University of Arizona for their help
in appreciating the role of water in contemporary Indian law and culture. Mr. Peter Sly,
Director, Conference of Western Attorneys General, read an earlier draft and corrected many
errors. The final version benefited greatly from his careful reading, but all dubious arguments
and conclusions are mine alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the 19th century, we stripped

the Indians of much of the natural

resource base, which had sustained them for centuries.' We converted their
commons into exclusive property rights 2 or excluded them from the remaining commons by checkerboard allotments.' United States Indian
policy was originally based on alliance and co-existence, but the westward
expansion of settlement made it impossible to maintain tribal enclaves
in the East. The election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 committed the nation to a firm policy of Indian removal.4 Federal Indian policies based on
subjugation and removal were initially justified because it was assumed
that Indians were destined to perish in the face of the advancing superior
European civilization., When the Indians did not become extinct as rapidly
as expected, they were herded onto reservations in the West, which were
initially viewed as hospices.'
After the Civil War, attitudes toward the Indians began to change
as part of a general effort to promote moral uplift through manipulation
of the social environment. Indians were once again recognized as individuals capable of redemption through the adoption of white values.8 Communal resources, however, had no part in this redemption. The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century policy of assimilation demanded that
existing reservations be quickly alloted in severalty and surplus lands be
distributed to non-Indians. Before all reservations were broken up, Indian policy again changed. During the New Deal, a vision of tribal sovereignty based on both native and non-native cultures 9 became the foun1. C. MARTIN, KEEPERS OF THE GAME: INDIAN-ANIMAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE FUR

(1978) traces this destruction to the seventeenth century. Martin's provocative thesis
is that contact with the Europeans destroyed the traditional Indian relationship with nature
and eliminated the previously existing taboos against over-exploitation of game.
TRADE

2. See W. CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY
OF NEW ENGLAND (1983). There is a vast literature that argues that Indians were superior
resource managers because of their concepts of communal and intergenerational obligations

to the land. Recent archaeological evidence, however, suggests that the Indian civilizations
such as the Anasazi perished because of overuse of the lands that they occupied. Browne,
New FindingsReveal Ancient Abuse of Lands, New York Times, Jan. 13, 1987, at 14, col.
1. For a perceptive argument that Indian relationships to nature cannot be a model for the
environmental movement, see C. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 157 (chapter entitled Epilogue:
The Indian and the Ecology Movement).
3. Getches, Water Rights on Indian Allotments, 26 S.D. L. REV. 405, 412-15 (1981).
4. A. DEBo, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 69-149 (1970) is a good
introduction to the history of removal.
5. For a splendid history of this tragic conceit, see B. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING
AMERICAN (1983).

6. "Early in December 1875 the government ordered all the [Sioux] Indians to the
reservations.... Evidently this was planned to further the extermination.. . . 'It is planned
that many shall die,' the older ones said." M. SANDOZ, LOVE SONG TO TIlE PLAINS 198 (1961).
7. The grand sweep of nineteenth century Indian policy is recounted in 1 F. PURCHA,
THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984).
8. "During the early years of American history the white community... believed that
over a period of time the Indians would be assimilated into white culture and become Christianized in the European tradition." V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE 6 (1983).
9. See Washburn, The HistoricalContext of American Indian Legal Problems, 40 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 12 (1976), for an overview of federal Indian policy.
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dation of federal policy, and protection of tribal rather than individual
0
rights remains the cornerstone of Indian policy.' This shift preserved the
shrunken reservations of the removal and assimilation eras with an unanticipated modern benefit: these previously undesirable lands on the frontier sometimes contained natural resources valuable to both Indians and
non-Indians." Many tribes were left in the position of undeveloped pro2
tectorates with a considerable natural resource base. The law is still workin Indian policy,
shift
century
19th
late
this
of
ing out the consequences
to terminate
1950s
the
in
attempts
vigorous
renewed
which has survived
13
the reservations.
Indian law is often a partial reflection of prevailing Indian policy, and
the law of Indian water rights is a classic example of this relationship.
In 1908, the Supreme Court recognized a new source of water rights for
Indian tribes to complement the then prevailing policy of assimilation through allotment. Winters v. United States" created federal reserved water rights for the benefit of Indian reservations. Reserved rights
were theoretically superior to most state-created rights. Although Winters
was probably only intended to support Indian Office subsistence irrigation projects," over time the "Winters" doctrine gave the tribes the legal
capability to assert claims to vast quantities of Western water, although
the tribes seldom had the financial capability to put their16potential reserved rights to actual beneficial use, even with subsidies. Non-Indian
lessees have been the primary beneficiaries of Winters because nonIndian irrigation projects were funded at a much higher rate than Indian
10. 2 F. PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 940-1086, recounts the New Deal policy of selfdetermination, the bitter opposition to it that produced the post-World War I I termination
policy and the return of the Kennedy Administration to self-determination. Clinton, Isolated
in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and SelfGovernment, 33 STAN. L. REV., 979, 984-91 (1981) traces the historical origins of the Indian
laws reliance on the tribal unit and presents a powerful case for the continued recognition
of tribal sovereignty.
11. Berthrong, Legacies of the Dawes Act: Bureaucrats and Land Thieves at the
Cheyenne-ArapahoAgencies of Oklahoma, in THE PLAINS INDIANS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 31 (P. Iverson ed. 19851 [hereinafter PLAINS INDIANS].
12. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDIAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 30 (1986) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE NAVAJO NATION: AN AMERICAN COLONY (1975).

13. See 2 F. PURCHA, supra note 7, at 1041-59.

14. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

15. Collins, The FutureCourse of the Winters Doctrine, 56 U. CoLo. L. REV. 481 (1985).
16. There are eighty-three Indian irrigation projects that range in size from over 100,000

acres to scattered units of a few acres each. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) operates
and maintains fifteen major projects, including those whose water delivery systems serve
both Indian and non-Indian land. Tribes are assisted in the maintenance of smaller systems,
especially when heavy equipment is required. The estimated cost of operation and maintenance
in 1982 was 18.2 million dollars, of which eleven million dollars was to be collected from
water users. Non-Indian users pay their full pro rata share of the operation and maintenance
costs, but certain Indian users are subsidized: (1) those financially unable to pay their
assessments, (2) those relieved of charges because of law or court decree, and (3)owners of
small garden tracts. This subsidy covers about ninety-four percent of the operation and
maintenance costs attributable to Indian lands. T. TAYLOR,THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
65 (1984).
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ones.17 Indians have always been almost totally dependent on federal
largess and remain largely so today. As a result, Indian water rights remained on the fringes of state and federal water law and were long ignored or denigrated by states and private users.
Most Winters claims are on interstate rivers or on their tributaries.
These rivers are subject to state-created rights based on existing or potential equitable apportionment decrees, interstate compacts or statutory apportionments. Until the 1963 Supreme Court decision in Arizona u. California, 1, states were able to allocate interstate rivers with little regard to
Indian water rights.'9 This is no longer possible. Indian tribes can effectively veto or delay many potential water development projects and
"cloud" state water titles by the assertion of Winters
or aboriginal water
rights." Conversely, some states see the recognition and protection of Indian water rights as a way to gain a competitive advantage over other
states in the future allocation of interstate streams by piggybacking state
onto Indian claims.
This article examines the relationship between Indian reserved rights
and the law of the allocation of interstate streams and aquifers through
equitable, compact or congressional apportionments. It addresses the
questions of who must bear the responsibility for the satisfaction of Indian water rights and how Indian claims have been and should be integrated into the assignment of state shares to interstate streams. My argument is that although Indian water rights are federal water rights, tribal
rights should be satisfied out of the share, however defined, of the state
or states in which the reservation lies. This is the current law and practice of the Western states, but there are counter arguments, and the principle is fraught with legal and political problems for both Indians and
non-Indians. On over-appropriated streams, such a simple rule could be
unfair to the state or states in which the reservation lies, as well as to up
17. "There is no question that during the early twentieth century ... Congress and
the Bureau of Reclamation consciously chose to subsidize heavily non-Indian water development at the expense of treaty-based Indian reserved water rights." Wilkinson, Perspectives
on Water and Energy in the American West and in Indian Country, 26 S.D. L. REv. 393,
397 (1981).
18. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
19. A recent example can be found in a statement by an official of the Bureau of Reclamation to the South Dakota Board of Water Management on the issue of the use of water stored
behind Oahe Reservoir on the Missouri for a coal slurry pipeline.
Indian water rights are an issue on which we do not have a ready solution.
... At this time, we can only agree that the Bureau will do everything it can
to assist the Indian people to develop their resources on the reservations ....
Our current policy for industrial water service contracts recognizes as a provision of such contracts that Indian water claims are pending and that once adjudicated to finality the contract would be subject to such final legal determination. We cannot stop all water development projects until Indian water
rights are quantified.
I BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT- ENERGY TRANSP. SYSTEMS,
INC., 3-4 (1981) (Statement of James A. Rawlings, Regional Supervisor of Water and Land,
Upper Missouri Region Bureau of Reclamation).
20. The New Mexico Pueblo Indians have water rights based not on Winters but on
rights recognized by the Spanish colonizers and protected by subsequent treaties. See infra
note 90.
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and downstream states. Indian claims can, for example, exceed either a
state's entire allocated share of a stream or the annual flow of a river as
they do in Arizona." And, in the long run, Indian tribes are exposed to
the risk that such powerful leverage against the states will produce sufficient political pressure for the federal government to exercise its plenary
power 2 to deprive tribes of the opportunities to use (on or off the reservation) their Winters entitlements.
The root of the problem of the integration of Indian and interstate
water rights is the Winters doctrine. Winters rights, as developed by the
courts, do not serve the interests of state water right holders because of
the uncertainty they create. Indian water entitlements can be unresponsive to real tribal needs. In the past, Indians have sought to extend
Winters to allow tribes to control large quantities of water to regain their
lost heritage. The states, in addition, have searched for blanket formulas
or methods to confine sharply Indian water entitlements. Both approaches
are futile. Each tribal-state conflict is different, and each calls for a separate negotiated settlement.2" States have long negotiated with tribes to
waive or defer Winters rights, but the settlements have not always been
21. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDIAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 124 (1986). Copy on file in the Law and Water Law Review Office.

22. Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 104 S. Ct. 2105
(1984); National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 105 S. Ct. 2447 (1985).
The Supreme Court's current sweeping characterization of federal authority belies the long
political and doctrinal struggle to define the relationship among Indians, the federal government and the states. Federal power over Indians rests primarily on the treaty and commerce
powers, but the Court has used a mix of inconsistent and changing theories to justify federal
regulation of Indians. The Supreme Court initially viewed Indian tribes as foreign nations.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Federal-Indian treaties remain an important source of Indian law, but during the assimilation era, the Court based federal power
on the idea of federal trusteeship over its Indian wards. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1886). Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), carried the new basis of federal
power to its logical conclusion and held that Congress could abrogate a treaty. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, JudicialReview of Indian TreatyAbrogation "As Long as Water
Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
601 (1975). Federal power is now described as plenary. This idea was originally suggested
by Felix Cohen in his HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942) as a theory of tribal immunity from state regulation, but in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958), Justice Black
applied the theory as a source of congressional supremacy as well. Federal power is now
a combination of all theories of the relationship between the tribes and the United States
because the issue is framed as solely one of federal preemption. However, Worcester retains
its vitality because the Supreme Court has said that the tribes retain pre-existing sovereignty
to make and administer laws. The power is now recognized to inform the analysis of federal
preemption of state law, especially in cases of the assertion of state jurisdiction over nonIndian activities on a reservation. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Brocher, 448 U.S. 136
(1980); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Indian tribes now have considerable
immunity from state regulation, but the question of protection from federal regulation remains very much open. See Clinton, supranote 10, at 991-1018, for an examination of possible sources of limitations on federal plenary power. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD:
INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY

(1980) is a thoughtful, extended argument for a theory

of tribal federalism.
23. Professor David Getches makes essentially the same argument in Management and
Marketing of Indian Water Rights: From Conflict to Pragmatism, Paper presented at the
First Annual Frank J. Trelease Western Water Rights Symposium, Jackson, Wyo. (Feb.
27-28, 1987) (to be revised and published in Symposium: Western Water Rights (PartII),
XXIII LAND & WATER L. REV. (1987) (Issue No. 1)).
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fair to the tribes. In recent years, the tribes have been able to negotiate
better settlements with the states, due in large part to the the threat of
Winters, and states have begun to move beyond trying to deny the
legitimacy of Winters. These settlements promise the hope of better statetribal water relations.2 4 The assignment of the responsibility for the satisfaction of Winters rights to the states can provide the necessary incentive for fairer state-Indian bargains.
Most Indian claims remain unquantified, but have been estimated as
high as forty-five million acre feet. Potential Winters rights claims in
Arizona stand at 31.3 million acre feet, many times the state's share of
the Colorado River. These claims will take on more significance to some
tribes as the promise of economic salvation through mineral royalties
fades. The actual use of Indian water rights is small because the tribes
lack either the financial capacity to use substantial amounts of water or
clear legal authority to market water for off-reservation uses. 2 Of the 50.2
million acres of tribal and Indian owned lands under the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 2,026,531 are devoted to dry farming and
only 917,580 to irrigation.2 8 American agriculture is declining generally
so it is unlikely that Indian agriculture will be significantly expanded. If
tribal agriculture is expanded, it is unlikely that such a policy would further Indian economic development. The future of Indian water, as many
have long recognized, lies in off-reservation uses. A recent Department
of the Interior Task Force on Indian Economic Development concluded
that leasing Indian water rights has "the potential to become a significant new source of revenue for some tribes."2 7 The range of new revenue
was speculatively estimated at between one-hundred million and one billion
dollars per year. This recommendation is consistent with the current Indian policy of tribal economic self-sufficiency, but now and for the
foreseeable future there are not enough prospective lessees to carry out
the policy.
II.

INDIAN AND INTERSTATE CLAIMS:

INCONSISTENT EXPECTATIONS, DIFFERENT RULES

A. State and Federal Claims:
The Expectation of Exclusive State Allocation
Indian and state interstate water rights are difficult to integrate
because they rest on inconsistent assumptions. Western interstate streams
are subject to the competing claims of three sovereigns-the federal gov24. Id.
25. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), recognized substantial reserved rights
for Indians. After the late 1970s, about sixty percent of the eligible lands were in agricultural
production, but Indians farmed only eight percent of these lands. Hundley, The West Against
Itself- The ColoradoRiver-An InstitutionalHistory, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO:
MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 9, 33-34 (G. Weatherford & F.L. Brown eds. 1986).
26. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 116.

27. Id at 124.
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ernment, states, and the Indian tribes. 8 Different legal principles apply
to each claim. The modern commerce clause gives the federal government
the plenary power to apportion interstate streams, subject only to the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. This power exists more in theory than
in practice because the history of Western water allocation is one of federal
deference to state water law.2 At the height of the post-New Deal era of
30
federal supremacy, in Arizona v. California,
the Supreme Court confirmed
the congressional decision to allocate interstate streams that earlier cases
upholding federal multiple-purpose projects had suggested.3' The Boulder
Canyon Project Act was found to be an exercise of the power, although
the Court's reading of the legislative history has been vigorously challenged.-2 More recently, South Dakota has filed an original action for a
declaration that congressional adoption of the Pick-Sloan plan for the
impoundment 33 of the Missouri River is a partial congressional apportionment.3 4 These rare instances aside, the states' quasi-sovereign interests
in resources located within their borders" give them a paramount interest
in the allocation of interstate waters.
In the absence of pervasive federal allocation, states have been left
to fight it out among themselves for the division of shared streams through
equitable apportionment actions, interstate compacts or less formal agreements.36 The Supreme Court originally created the expectation that the
Western states had exclusive rights to Western interstate waters; dictum
in Kansas v. Colorado37 and Nebraska v. Wyomings suggested that the
federal government had no power to allocate interstate waters. This analysis was later repudiated to accommodate the federal government's New
Deal commitment to the conservation era idea of multiple-purpose river
basin development. But, during this century, the federal government
28. They are also sometimes subject to a fourth category of claims-those of Canada
and Mexico. A discussion of the allocation of water between nations is beyond the scope
of this article. See generally H. Garretson, The Law of International Drainage Basins (1967).
29. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), on remand 509 F. Supp. 867 (E.D.
Cal. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982).
30. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
31. E.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
32. N. HUNDLEY, WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE
POLITICS OF WATER INTHE AMERICAN WEST 266-70 (1975). The Supreme Court has recently
said that congressional ratification of an interstate compact is an exercise of the federal power
to apportion interstate waters, and thus the Court lacks the equitable jurisdiction to reform
a compact. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983).
33. The Pick-Sloan plan is a 1944 forced congressional marriage of rival proposals by
the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers to develop the Missouri River.
The plan envisioned a series of multiple-purpose dams and irrigation projects, but only the
flood control and navigation enhancement portions of the plan have been fully implemented.
The plan is the subject of current litigation over the respective authority of the Bureau and
the Corps to market water from Pick-Sloan reservoirs on the mainstem of the Missouri.
Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1986), U.S. appealpending (1986).
34. South Dakota v. Missouri, Orig. No. 103 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1985). Copy on file in the
Land and Water Law Review Office.
35. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
36. See Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, Restated,
56 U. CoLo. L. REV. 381 (1985).
37. 206 U.S. 46, 85-92 (1907).
38. 325 U.S. 589, 611-16 (1945).
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primarily supported state allocation choices by providing the money to
construct the necessary works to put the waters
of interstate streams to
39
beneficial uses as the states defined them.
Western states were allowed to pursue their interstate water interests
with slight concern for the claims of Indian tribes. Indian water rights
were often noted, but they did not deter many proposed or executed proj ects. The need to maintain good relations with Canada and Mexico has
forced the federal government to share by treaties international rivers
which bind the states.40 But, until relatively recently, no such powerful
political dynamic benefited Indian tribes,4'I although the tribes are sovereign entities of comparable dignity to the states.42 The Supreme Court
recognized that Indian tribes could obtain superior claims to state appropriation rights junior to the date of the creation of the reservation, but
during a good part of this century Indian claims have seldom been an immediate threat to the enjoyment of state-created water rights because
tribal development lagged far behind non-Indian uses. As a result, Indian
water rights are not well integrated into state water law and the law of
equitable apportionment. Recently, a more consistent law and practice
is emerging from the ad hoc deals that have been struck with tribes to
remove projects or to settle long standing disputes. Many Western states
have begun to recognize that continued indifference to Indian claims is
not a sensible water strategy and that state and tribal interests may complement each other. As a result, more balanced and integrated state-Indian
settlements are emerging.
B. States Rights, Indian Rights: Separate Paths
Indian and state equitable apportionment claims arose almost simultaneously between 1907-1908 during the conservation and reclamation
39. The Reclamation era is now over. Two recent important studies of the abuses of
the Bureau of Reclamation are R. REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND
ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986) and D. WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY AND
THE AMERICAN WEST (1985).
40. See, e.g., Meyers & Noble, The ColoradoRiver: The Treaty With Mexico, 19 STAN.
L. REV. 367 (1967).
41. Ingram, Scaff & Silko, Replacing Confusion With Equity: Alternatives for Water
Policy in the Colorado River Basin, in NEw COURSES, supra note 25, at 177, 178.
42. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S. Ct. 2305,
2313 (1986) (citations recast in bluebook form) described tribal sovereignty:
The common law sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is a necessary
corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance. [See, e.g., Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 4911978).] Of course, because of the peculiar "quasisovereign" status of the Indian tribes, the Tribe's immunity is not congruent
with that which the Federal Government, or the States, enjoy. [United States
v. United Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940); cf. McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1972.] And this aspect of
tribal sovereignty, like all others, is subject to plenary federal control and definition. [See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).] Nonetheless,
in the absence of federal authorization, tribal immunity, like all aspects of tribal
sovereignty, is privileged from diminution by the States.
States, of course, deny this characterization of Indian tribes. Constitutional guarantees of
federalism give the state greater protection against the federal government compared to
Indian tribes. But, the protections are primarily political after Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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eras. However, the law of these claims developed separately. Equitable
apportionment carried Western water law forward; the law of Winters
threatened to undermine the doctrine of prior appropriation. The law of
equitable apportionment, despite stray dictum in the cases, has remained
constant since 1922. Indian water rights in contrast, can be divided into
three periods, 1908-1963, 1963-1976 and 1976 to the present.
1. State's Rights
Kansas v. Colorado,4 decided in 1907, held that the Supreme Court
had original jurisdiction to adjudicate the competing claims of riparian
states to interstate streams, but the source of the doctrine and the standards to be applied were left vague." It is widely assumed that equitable
apportionment applies both to surface and groundwater,4 5 but there has
been no equitable apportionment of an interstate aquifer. State water law
was soon adopted as the principal source of federal common law.
Three aspects of the doctrine of equitable apportionment are most relevant to the integration of Indian and state claims because they illuminate
the sources of tension between those claims. First, among the Western
states, priority of use is the presumed rule of allocation.4 6 The Court has
departed from the strict enforcement of priorities only when established
economies based on junior uses could be protected at comparatively little increase in risk to senior uses or a senior call was likely to be futile."
Language in more recent opinions appears to downplay the role of priority, but the Court has not seriously departed from it. In Colorado v. New
Mexico 1,48 the Court suggested that an existing use could be bumped
in favor of a more efficient new one, and remanded the case for further
findings on the comparative efficiencies of the two competing uses. On
remand, the Court retreated from equating beneficial use with efficiency
and protected the existing, low-valued use.4 9 Colorado v. New Mexico I
and I1 cast some doubt on the future of priority uber alles, but predictions about the imposition of a strict duty to conserve, or more open-ended
balancing, are highly speculative. 50 In theory, Indian water rights fare well
under the rule of priority determined by the generous relation-back theory
of Winters because reservations generally pre-dated white settlement, but
the tribes would suffer if protection of existing beneficial uses were the
sole rule because their actual uses are small.
The second relevant rule is that states must sue parens patriaein
original jurisdiction. The parenspatriaerule requires that the state assert
43. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
44. See generally Tarlock, supra note 36, at 394-95.
45. Fisher, EquitableApportionment of Interstate Ground Waters, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 721, 735 (1974).
46. Wyoming v. Colorado, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
47. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
48. 459 U.S. 176 (1982).

49. Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
50. Grant, The Future of InterstateAllocation of Water, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
977 (1985), is a careful examination of this argument.
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a quasi-sovereign interest above the interest of individual water users."
States must represent the interests of their citizens and this limitation
has been construed by the Supreme Court to exclude state representation of Indian water claims, although Indians are citizens of the state in
which they reside.12 Indian representation must either come from the
federal government or directly from the tribe. The third barrier is the rule
that original jurisdiction will, in theory, be accepted only to redress nonspeculative threats of injury. A mere tribal assertion of a Winters right,
without proof of a substantial immediate injury will not be sufficient to
convince the Court to take original jurisdiction.
2. Indian Rights.
Indian water rights were first recognized in Winters v. United States,13
but the impact of Winters was not fully appreciated because the destablizing theory of the case was never clearly articulated. The Fort Belknap
project was one of the first experiments with Indian irrigation and Winters
was a product of two forces. Federal Indian policy had shifted from removal and eradication to the hope of Indian salvation through assimilation. Recently created reservations were to be alloted in severalty and the
surplus lands opened to white settlement; both Indians and non-Indians
were to develop these lands through irrigation. Assimilation was complemented by the conservation movement which sought to develop the West
through irrigation. Both assimilation and reclamation of water sought to
promote Western settlement by increasing the land available to white settlement, 54 but both policies supported modest Indian irrigation to give
Indians a chance to compete with white settlers.
The Fort Belknap reservation was created in 1888 by an agreement,
ratified by Congress, which reduced substantially land that had been set
aside for five tribes in 1874 by Congress. A year later the federal government began to divert small amounts of water (not involved in the litigation) from the Milk River for an Indian irrigation project, but substantial
use did not start until 1898-99. Within a year, 30,000 reservation acres
were under cultivation. In 1898, before these substantial federal diversions, upstream non-Indian irrigators, brought to the area by the completion of the Great Northern Railroad in 1890, recorded entries on the
public domain under the Homestead and Desert Land Acts, posted notices
of an intent to appropriate and immediately commenced construction of
the necessary, simple diversion works. These rights were superior to the
Indians under Montana law. In 1905, extensive upstream uses combined
with a severe drought deprived the reservation of needed irrigation water,
and the federal government as trustee sued to enjoin interferences with
the Fort Belknap project.
51.
52.
53.
54.

North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923).
See, e.g., United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534 (1971).
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
2 F. PURCHA, supra note 7, at 894.
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The United States Attorney initially argued that the Indians were
prior appropriators, but to his great surprise, this assumption proved false.
He then asserted that the reservation had riparian rights and, in the time
honored tradition of litigators, threw in a vague reference to possible treaty
rights.5 The settlers relied, of course, on state law. It was the district
judge, however, who took the government's riparian argument a step further and issued an injunction based on water rights reserved in the treaty that initially led to the creation of the reservation." The Supreme Court
agreed and held that the 1888 agreement reserved sufficient water to turn
57
the Indians into "a pastoral and civilized people,1 a use that the tribes
58
continue to enjoy. Only Justice Brewer, the author of Kansas v. Colorado,
dissented.
55. Norris Hundley, Jr., has examined the history of the creation of the reservation
and of the decision. The federal government initially asserted that the Indian's had been
the first to put the water to use under state law, but to protect the tribes should it lose on
this issue, the complaint alleged that the reservation had "riparian and other rights." After
the federal district judge issued a temporary restraining order, the settlers established prior
rights. The United States Attorney then switched to a riparian theory, but in a decision "that
took all parties by surprise," the district judge issued an injunction against the settlers because
the Indians reserved sufficient water for irrigation in the treaty creating the reservation.
Hundley, The Winters Decision and Indian Water Rights: A Mystery Reexamined, in PLAINS
INDIANS, supra note 25, 77, 85.
56. Although no treaty existed because the reservation was a post-treaty era reservation created by agreement. Id at 85.
57. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908). There is little in Justice McKenna's background to predict the decision. McKenna replaced his fellow Californian and architect of the pivotal theories that legitimated private use of the public domain-Justice
Stephen Field. Justice McKenna was a self-educated California lawyer who rose through
dutiful service to the Republican party and, particularly, Senator Leland Stanford. Ironically, McKenna was not named President McKinley's Secretary of the Interior because Protestant missionaries feared having a Catholic administer Indian education. Winters is,
however, consistent with Justice McKenna's expansive views of federal authority under the
Commerce Clause which distinguished him from similar conservative justices with whom
he served. Watts, Justice McKenna, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1719 (1969).
58. After Winters a 10,425 acre irrigation project was constructed on the Fort Belknap
reservation to allow the tribes to enjoy their water right, which amounts to the approximate
annual natural flow of the Milk. The Milk is an international river that originates in Glacier
National Park. As part of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, the United States was awarded seventy-five percent of the Milk's flow, and Canada received similar rights to the Saint
Mary's River, which also originates in the Park and flows almost due north into Alberta.
In 1946, the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) built Fresno Dam and Reservoir on the Milk some
fifty miles upstream from the reservation. The Tribe's natural flow Winters' right was
recognized in a BOR-BIA operating agreement; the agreement gave the tribes an additional
1/7 interest in the waters of the Milk stored behind Fresno Dam near Havre, Montana. The
right does not include waters of the Saint Mary's River diverted into the Milk. Between
1983 and 1985, there was a severe drought in Montana, and by July 1985 the entire natural
flow of the Milk had dried up and the tribes had used up their full 1/7 interest in the Fresno
Reservoir. The Bureau of Indian Affairs acceded to the Bureau of Reclamation's request
to close the Fort Belknap Irrigation Project diversion. In August of that same year, "[d]ue
to insufficient water and fear of 'water pirates' who might divert the water before the Tribes
could receive it, BOR and BIA decided not to release any water and the Fort Belknap Irrigation Project remained closed." Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 10, Gros Ventre & Assisiboine Tribes of Fort Belknap Indian Comm'y of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation, Montana v. Hodel, No. CV-85-213-GF (D. Mont. Aug. 22, 1985). The tribes immediately filed
suit to protect their senior Winters rights, but August rains made it possible for BOR and
BIA to agree to a temporary schedule of reservoir releases. The suit was dismissed without
prejudice in July, 1986.
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The majority's reading of the agreement represented a major implication of treaty rights. To support his expansive reading of the agreement,
Justice McKenna seems to have analogized it to a treaty so as to apply
the already familar rule that treaties should be construed for the benefit
of the Indians as wards of the federal government. He dealt with the problem of implied water rights simply by asking rhetorically: "Did they reduce
the area of their occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable
or adequate?" ' 9 Because of the brevity of the opinion, scholars have long
viewed Winters as an aberration and difficult to justify"0 although cases
involving the Treaty" and Property 62 powers were cited as justification
for the "undeniable" power to reserve waters. Scholars continue to debate
the basis for the decision. The debate centers around whether the Indians
had the water before a treaty or agreement or were given it by the federal
government,6 an issue that took on some significance in the 1970s as In4
dians asserted sweeping aboriginal rights."
Winters is best understood as both a product of, and a counter to,
then prevailing Indian policy. Irrigation complemented allotment, and it
was widely assumed that Indians and non-Indians would be subject to
the same water law. Indian irrigation was a small Indian Office program
until 1901 when it became more formalized. A modern historian of assimilation concludes that the common assumption was that both Indians and
non-Indians would compete for available water under the doctrine of prior
appropriation:
Every law providing for the irrigation of reservation lands stipulated that local regulations would govern the Indians' access to
water. Beneficial use was sure to control water assignments on
the new projects. Thus, reluctant allottees or those unable to farm
could lose their water to their "energetic" white neighbors who
would begin farming later than the Indians but who would stand
ready to make beneficial use of their water. In addition, all of the
projects were constructed with appropriations from tribal accounts. When a group's treasury was inadequate, the Indian Office would advance the money in anticipation of a reimbursement.
To ensure the repayment, it was essential that the surplus lands
within them-the lands not assigned to allottees-be sold. When
water rights were in danger, the value of those surplus lands was
nil."
59. Id.

60. Bloom, "Paramount"Rights To Water Use, 16

RocKY MTN. MIN.

L.

FOUND.

669

(1971) summarizes the different readings of Winters.
61. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 37 (1905).
62. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
63. See Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: FederalReservation Of
Rights To The Use of Water, 3 B.Y.U. L. REV. 639, 652-54 (1975).
64. The celebrated "Globe Equity Decree," United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist.,
Globe Equity No. 59 (D. Ariz., June 29, 1935), first recognized aboriginal rights for the Pima
Indians. See Merrill, Aboriginal Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 465 (1980).
65. F. HOXIE, TIlE FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS,
1880-1920 162-163 (1984).
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If Indian water rights were based on state law, the Indians would have
been frozen into a permanent position of resource inferiority. This may
have been what assimilation intended and thus Winters is wrong. But,
Winters identified the fundamental problem with assimilation-Indians
would not be able to compete effectively with the rush of white settlement-and countered it by basing Indian rights on the long-term needs
of the tribal community. The theory that the property clause allows Congress to claim federal proprietary rights is an adequate formal justification for Indian water rights. But, it fails to give adequate weight to the
federal common law nature of Winters rights because Justice McKenna
treated congressional intent as close to a fiction.
Winters stated a broader principle which has allowed Indian water
law to adapt to changed perceptions of Indian welfare because it is based
on the core idea, which has seen fruit in much recent hunting and fishing
treaty litigation:66 Indians are entitled to some measure of resource security as an attribute of tribal sovereignty.67 Natural resources-streams,
lakes, mountains-are often central to native American cultural traditions. 8 In contrast, the Judeo-Christian heritage focuses on the relationship between man and a single God who is not part of nature and views
natural resources as given for human exploitation.69 The recognition of
Indian rights to the use and enjoyment of water is a way to enhance the
dignity of tribal members similar to the role that due process plays in our
constitutional system.7 ° This argument.is also consistent with the Indian

66. E.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); Washington v. Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 1086 (1979); see also F. COHEN, supra note 22, at 441-70.
67. Sovereignty and proprietary claims are said to be analytically different. The distinction stems from the Roman concepts of imperiurn and dominimum. Sovereign and proprietary
claims to natural resources are, however, connected, although the connection is both complex and limited. In his last piece of scholarship, the late Dean Frank J. Trelease found a
link between sovereignty and state control over its natural resources in the equal footing
doctrine that the Supreme Court has read into the constitution. Trelease, Interstate Use
of Water- "Sporhase v. El Paso, Pike & Vermejo", XXII LAND & WATER L. REV. 315 (1987).
Some measure of access to natural resources is essential to sovereignty, but there are substantial limitations on state proprietary claims based on sovereignty. The Ninth Circuit rightly
refused to legalize the Sagebrush Rebellion and impose a duty on the federal government
to divest itself of the public domain. Nevada ex rel. Nevada State Bd. of Agriculture v. United
States, 512 F. Supp. 166 (D. Nev. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983). Further, the
tenth amendment does not preclude federal resource allocation choices that are inconsistent
with state choices. Garcia v. San Antonia Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Cf Granite Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 Sup. Ct. 1419 (1987).
68. V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 8, at 238 (1983). F.L. BROWN & H. INGRAM,
WATER AND POVERTY IN THE SOUTHWEST: CONFLICT, OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE
(manuscript 1986) [hereinafter WATER AND POVERTY] is an extended examination of the role

of Indian and Hispanic community values in water allocation.
69. J. PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 3-27 (1974) remains the most
lucid exposition of the Judaic and Hellenistic roots of this central idea of Western values.
70. For a recent anthropological justification for this argument, see M. KNACK & 0.
STEWART, As LONG AS THE RIVER SHALL RUN: AN ETHNOHISTORY OF PYRAMID LAKE RESERVATION (1984). This reasoning played a role in a seminal case recognizing the trust respon-

sibility of the federal government to protect Pyramid Lake. See Pyramid Lake Piute Tribe
v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
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Freedom of Religion Act of 1978 which requires that Indian use of natural
resources for religious purposes must be considered in federal land management decisions."
This argument cannot be pressed to extremes because it lends itself
to ready abuse by both the tribes and the states. This theory both supports Indians' claims to vast quantities of waters that bear no relationship to modern Indian culture and to current reservation needs, and state
2
arguments that tribes with a nomadic history have no claims to water.
The first use of the theory is unfair to the legitimate expectations of nonIndian users that state-created rights will be protected. The second use
makes a parody of the use of enthnography as a source of Indian policy
and law7 3 and denies the fact that Indian culture has changed in response
to contact with non-Indians. 7 ' Finally, as the Supreme Court has observed
"[t]he availability of water determines the character of life and culture"'5
for all in the West. Linking Indian water rights to tribal rather than nonIndian culture, as the Court did in Winters, is intended only to establish
the legitimacy of Indian claims and the need to move beyond the discredited Indian policy that produced the decision. Indian water rights are tied
to the idea of a tribal community, and the tribal community should be
able to define the relationship between water use and community welfare.
Winters rights should not, for example, be limited to irrigation. But,
because Indians and non-Indians now share the same landscape, Indian

71. Pub. L. No. 95-341, § 1, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)).
Protection of Indian religious freedom requires protection of specific sacred sites. See Note,

Indian Religious Freedom and GovernmentalDevelopment of Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J.
1447 (1985); Stambor, Manifest Destiny and American IndianReligious Freedom:Sequoyah,
Badoni, and The Drowned Gods, 1O AM. INDIAN L. REV. 59( 1982). Courts have been hostile

to this application of the first amendment to federal land management decisions, e.g., Wilson
v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Baldoni v. Higginson,
638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 454 (1981) (refusal to require modification of the operation of Glen Canyon Dam to protect a sacred site in Rainbow Bridge National Monument), but Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d
581 (9th Cir. 1985), upheld an injunction against a proposed Forest Service road and timber
harvesting plan in an area considered sacred to surrounding Indians because the actions
would burden the free exercise of religion. The court set a high standard because the entire
area was alleged to be sacred: "The Indians have to show that the area at issue is indispensable and central to their religious practices and beliefs and that the governmental actions
would seriously interfere or impair those religious practices." 764 F.2d at 585.
72. In Holly v. Totus, 812 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1987) (invalidated a portion of the Yakima
Nation tribal water code that regulated the use of excess waters by non-Indians living on
the reservation). The court followed the analysis it developed in United States v. Anderson,
736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984). The Yakima Nation argued that tribal regulation of "excess
water" was critical to the life-style of the Tribe, but the Ninth Circuit found no facts to support this contention.
73. For example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's head of the BIA, John Collier, was
accused of over-emphasizing "the value of traditional tribal governments instead of laying
the conceptual foundation for the tribe's right to govern themselves by any means they chose."
R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 22, 118 (1980).
74. See E. SPICER, CYCLES OF CONQUEST (1962). The Northern Plains Buffalo culture
can never be reproduced because of fundamental environmental and cultural changes.
75. United States v. Nevada, 463 U.S. 110, 145 (1983) (Brennan J. concurring).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/25

14

Tarlock: One River, Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate Water Rights
1987

INDIAN AND INTERSTATE WATER RIGHTS

water rights must be limited by the conservation and sharing principles
76
that apply to all natural resources.
Winters can also be explained by less philosophical reasons. Since Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester, the Court has long exercised the
role of protecting the Indian minority from a hostile majoritarian political
process. Under the idea of plenary federal power-developed to allow the
Department of the Interior to intervene to benefit the tribes-the Court
has sometimes simply validated prevailing Indian policy." But the Court
has continued to protect the Indian minority8 despite the twists and turns
of Supreme Court Indian jurisprudence." Winters built on Worcester's
foundation because the Court counter-balanced the inherent disadvantages
of the federal policy of assimilation through allotment in severalty by giving Indians the needed measure of resource security to compete with the
superior surrounding civilization." Under this analysis, Winters rests on
the need to differentiate between the future water needs of Indians and
non-Indians. Most major water allocation conflicts in the West are not
about absolute scarcity, but about the margin of safety the right holder
should enjoy. The federal government has built carry-over storage reservoirs to guarantee large quantities of municipal and irrigation rights, but
few Indians enjoy such protection. Indians too are entitled to a margin
of safety, and Winters recognizes this by reserving water for the future
needs of the reservation because Indians need a greater time horizon in
which to decide what to do about their water resources.
C. Answered and Unanswered Winters Questions
Winters raises a number of questions that determine how much the
tribes may benefit from Winters rights. The major ones are (1) the standard for the quantification of the right, (2) whether Indian rights extend
to uses other than irrigation, (3) whether the Winters right is limited to
the original purposes of the reservation or extends to the changing needs
of the tribe, (4) whether Winters rights can be transferred on and, more
76. Cf Northern Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1986) (Secretary may
enact hunting regulations to prevent the endangerment or extinction of a species, at least
to prevent overuse by one tribe that threatens to deprive another tribe of treaty rights).
Some Indians continue to assert that the application of federal wildlife regulations law to
hunting practices constitutes an abrogation of treaty rights or an infringment of Indian
religious practices. Coggins & Modrcin, Native American Indians and FederalWildlife Law,

31 STAN. L. REV.375 (1979) is persuasive argument that Indians are subject to federal wildlife
regulation.
77. The high water mark of judicial incorporation of federal Indian policy is Tee-HitTon Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1954), which held, during the last termination
cycle of federal Indian policy, that Alaskan native lands occupied "since time immemorial,"
but not confirmed by Congress, could be taken without compensation.
78. See C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW-NATIVE
A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1987).

SOCIETIES IN

79. R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 22, at 205-87 (1980) is the most articulate

exposition of the argument that increased recognition of tribal sovereignty is necessary to
guarantee Indians political liberty.

80. Cf Collins, supra note 15, at 482-83.
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8
importantly off, the reservation to Indian as well as non-Indian users, '
(5) whether Winters extends to groundwater and (6) whether tribes are
subject to the same duty to use water efficiently to which state-created
right holders are subject. This last issue has taken on some urgency as
state definitions of beneficial use are tightened to require the more efficient use of water.

Cases have provided tentative answers to some of these questions,
but the precedents provide limited guidance on crucial issues such as the
82
power of Indians to transfer Winters rights and the scope of the Winters
right. For example, rights have been recognized to support a trout fishery, 3 and a mineral development, 4 but a district court in Montana has
held that the Flathead Tribe could not dedicate water for instream flows
when there is a threat that non-Indian users in an Indian irrigation system
will be deprived of potential deliveries and suggested that federal law pro82
hibits a tribe from allocating water to instream flows. Litigation is not
likely to provide satisfactory general answers to these questions. The proper forum for the answer to many of these questions is a negotiated settle81. The Supreme Court has only tangentially addressed the issue. United States v.
Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939), holds that Indian water rights appurtenant to a parcel alloted
to a tribal member pass to the non-Indian transferee of the land. In Arizona v. California
II, 460 U.S. 605, 654 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations recast into bluebook form),
Justice Brennan opined in dissent that "ItIhe Tribes can probably lease their rights to others
with the consent of the United States .... [See F. COHEN, supra note 22, at 592-93; Meyers,
The ColoradoRiver, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 71 (1966); cf 2Op. Solicitor of Dep't of the Interior
Relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974, at 1930 (1964).]"
82. See, e.g., Leapart, Sale and Lease of Indian Water Rights, 33 MONT. L. REV. 266
(1972); Boyden & Pubsley, Use of Indian Water in Developing Mineral Properties,Water
Acquisition for Mineral Development Institute, Paper No. 5 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found.
1978); Wilkinson, Indian Controland Use of Water for MineralDevelopment, Institute on

Indian Land Development-Oil, Gas, Coal, and Other Minerals, Paper No. 9 (Rocky Mtn.
Min. L. Found. 1976).
83. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); see also Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1183 (1985); United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983);
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd., 713 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1983); see also Note, Transferabilityof Reserved Rights from
the Indian Allottee to the Non-Indian Purchaser:Are the purposes of the reservation and
the interestsof the tribe really served? Colville ConfederatedTribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42
(9th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L. W. 3133 (U.S. Aug. 18, 1981) (No. 81-321), XVII
LAND & WATER L. REV. 154 (1982).

84. Report Concerning Reserved Right Claims By and On Behalf of The Tribes of the
Wind River Indian Reservation, Wyoming at 67, In re: The General Adjudication of All Rights
to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, Civil
No. 4993 (Wyo. 5th Jud. Dist. 1982) (Teno Roncalio, Special Master) (copy on file in Land
& Water Law Review office).
85. Joint Bd. of Control v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mont. 1986). The court
relied on 25 U.S.C. § 381 (1982). This pre-Winters statute requires the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations to "secure a just and equal distribution thereof among Indians residing upon such reservations," although no such regulations have ever been published.
Previous cases had applied the section to empower the Department of the Interior to ensure
that all Indians on a reservation obtain some share of their inchoate water right in times
of shortage. E.g., United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1938); Anderson v. Spear-Morgan
Livestock Co., 107 Mont. 18, 79 P.2d 667 (1938); United States v. Alexander, 131 F.2d 359
(9th Cir. 1942).
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ment, and increasingly these settlements provide ad hoc but better
answers to these questions."
Winters has been consistently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, 7 but
it has never amplified Justice McKenna's analysis. Subsequent cases extended Winters to non-treaty, executive order reservations.8 The recognition of rights for these reservations suggests that reserved rights are
grantedby the United States instead of reserved by the Indians. Pueblo
water rights in New Mexico and the aboriginal rights of the Gila Indians
in Arizona89 are the major exception to this rule because they rest on Indian irrigation practices recognized by the Spanish and the Mexican governments before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago. 90 These limited instances aside, this reading of Winters precludes aboriginal rights, but in
most cases the date of the reservation will give the Indians a wide margin
of priority.
Both equitable apportionment and Winters were developed to allocate
surface waters, but it seems clear that Indian reservations have groundwater rights as well. 91 Rights can be asserted either under Winters or, as
Dean Charles J. Meyers has suggested, based on the tribe's property interest in the overlying lands of the reservation.92 Water would still be allocated on the basis of overlying land ownership and allocated by a sharing rule among all overlying land owners. 3 No court has so held, but recent state-Indian
water settlements include both surface and groundwater
94
resources.
86. E.g., The Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293,
96 Stat. 1274 (1982); [hereinafter Pub. L. No. 97-293] (discussed infra notes 184-94) allows
the Papago Tribe to sell or exchange water on or off the reservation (but within the Tucson
Active Management Area) subject to tribal and Secretarial approval, but disclaims an intent "to establish whether or not reserved water may be put to use, or sold for use, off any
reservation to which reserved rights attach." Id. § 306(c); see Laney, TransferabilityUnder
the Papago Water Rights Settlement, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 421 (1984).
87. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128
(1976).
88. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
89. See infra note 90.
90. New Mexico v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993 (N.M. 1985) (Pueblos have a prior right
to use all the water of a stream system for domestic uses and traditional irrigation except
for land and appurtenant water rights terminated by Congress.); New Mexico v. Aamodt,
537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1121 (1977). See generally C. DUMARS,
M. O'LEARY & A. UTTON, PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS (1984); E. DOZIER, THE PUEBLO
INDIANS Op NORTH AMERICA (1970).
91. The first case to consider the issue held that the owners of land within a reservation were not damaged by the extraction of groundwater for oil and gas operations, but assumed that Winters applied to groundwater. Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont.
1968).
92. Meyers, FederalGroundwaterRights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States, XIII
LAND & WATER L. REV. 377 (1978). But cf Gila Pima-Maricopa Indian Comm'y v. United
States, 9 Ct. Cl. 660 (1986) (United States has no duty to protect all groundwater underlying reservations, only amount necessary to satisfy Winters rights.)
93. See Note, Indian Claims to Groundwater:Reserved Rights or Beneficial Interest?
33 STAN. L. REV. 103 (1980), which also argues that Indian groundwater rights should be
based on Indian ownership of the overlying lands instead of reserved rights. Rights would
be allocated according to the amount of land owned by the Indians.
94. See infra note 208. The Safe Drinking Water Act of July 1, 1944, ch. 373, Title XIV,
§ 1401 as added Pub. L. No. 93-523, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1661 (1974); and amended Pub. L. No.
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In the Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act,9 the Papago
Tribe (now the Tohono O'Oham nation) agreed to waive its groundwater
claims on the San Xavier Reservation south of Tucson and Schuck Toak
District of the Sells Papago Reservation. 6 The San Xavier and part of
the Shuck Toak District lies within the Active Management Area designated under the state's groundwater management code and the tribe
agreed to limit its pumping to 10,000 acre feet per year and to take 37,800
acre feet of the Central Arizona Project water to be put to use in improved
and new irrigation projects jointly financed by the federal, state, local governments and private parties. 9 The Act disclaims an intent "to establish
whether or not the Federal reserved rights doctrine applies, or does not
apply, to groundwater,"" but the effect of this standard disclaimer on
the subsequent assertion of Winters rights is unclear. 9
III.

ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA: INDIANS WIN BIG,

Too

BIG?

A. Arizona v. California
Winters rights were recognized by district and circuit courts of appeal after 1907,' 0o but they were not of a sufficient actual or potential magnitude to chill private or public investment based on state water rights.
Arizona v. California I'll changed all this by recognizing expansive Indian reserved rights to the Colorado and rejecting theories that would
limit the scope of Winters.1 1 2 The federal government intervened in the
litigation, after strenuous efforts by Arizona and the Upper Basin states
to block the petition," 3 as trustee for the Indians and asserted rights for
94-317, Title III, § 301(b)(2), 90 Stat. 707 (1976); Pub. L. No. 94-484, Title IX, § 905(b)(4),
90 Stat. 2325 (1976); Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 8(b), 91 Stat. 1397 (1977); Pub. L. No. 99-339,
Title III, § 302(b), 100 Stat. 666 (1986).

95. Pub. L. No. 97-293, supra note 84, at 1274-95. See F.L.

BROWN

& H. INGRAM,

WATER

supra note 66, at 135-228, for a cultural history of the dispute, the negotiation of the settlement and the issues that the nation must confront to put the water to an
effective use.
96. The waiver extends to existing and future claims. Pub. L. No. 97-293, supra note
86, § 307(D), at 1281.
97. Id. § 313. The Tribe also agreed to take 28,200 acre feet of Tucson sewage effluent.
373 U.S. 546 (1963). See generally Meyers, supra note 81.
98. Id. § 303(e).
99. Section 306(a) allowed limited groundwater extraction, in addition to domestic and
stockwatering wells, on the reservation. Id § 306(a).
100. E.g., United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 988, revd on other grounds, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964), cert denied, 381 U.S.
988 (1956); United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
101. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). A pre-Arizona v.California article argued that Winters was
limited to reservations created with Indian participation in an irrigation project. Sondheim
& Alexander, Federal Indian Water Rights: A Retrogression to Quasi-RiparianRights, 34
So. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1960).
102. See, for example, Pelcyger, Indian Water Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers,21
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 743, 753-64 (1976), for a discussion of state resistance to the obvious application of Winters to groundwater.
103. Arizona was successful in preventing William Veeder, a Department of Justice attorney knowledgeable in Western water and Indian law, from arguing the federal governAND POVERTY,

ment's position. The story is told in P. FRADKIN, A

RIVER

No

MORE: THE COLORADO AND

156-61 (1981). Veeder's long standing argument that Indian water rights are
aboriginal rights that pre-date the acquisition of the West by the United States and were

THE WEST

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/25

18

Tarlock: One River, Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate Water Rights
1987

INDIAN AND INTERSTATE WATER RIGHTS

five small reservations in the three states along the lower Colorado.'"0 The
principal holding of the case is that Congress has the power to apportion
interstate streams and exercised it to guarantee Arizona 2,800,000 acre
feet regardless of priorities claimed by California. But, the big winners in
the litigation were Indian tribes and federal land management agencies
which received extensive water entitlements as "present perfected rights."
Winters has long been viewed as "a singular judicial effort to reclaim some
measure of national self-respect out of the shambles of American policy
toward American Indians."' 05 As the previous section argues, this is incorrect. Arizona v. California was a logical extension of the Supreme
Court's protection of tribal perogatives against majoritarian insensitivity.
Arizona v. CaliforniaI was a surprise to the Western states in large
part because Indian water rights were considered negligible at the time
that the Colorado River was first apportioned by the 1922 Colorado River
Compact.'- Winters had benefited non-Indians more than Indians because
the former ended up using Indian-alloted lands and appurtenant water
rights.' 7 Indian representatives were not part of the compact negotiations
and the federal government did not act as trustee for effected tribes. To
mollify Indian advocates, the federal representative, Herbert Hoover, insisted on including Article VII which states that "Nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting the obligations of the United States
of America to Indian tribes." Indifference to Indian claims set a powerful precedent. Hoover, however, did not think that his "Wild Indian
clause" would play a significant role in the development of the river.108
After the Colorado River Compact, eighteen more interstate compacts
were negotiated on Western rivers, 0 9 but most compacts have either been
silent on the issue of Indian rights or have exempted Indian rights from
their allocation provisions."' Hoover was right that the clause would not
become a major element in the "Law of the River," but he was dead wrong
about the future impact of Indian claims."'
confirmed by subsequent acts of cession or conquest is set forth in Veeder, IndianPriorand
ParamountRights versus State Rights, 51 N.D. L. REV. 107 (1974); Indian Water Rights
in the UpperMissouriRiver Basin, 48 N.D. L. REV. 617 (1972); Indian Priorand Paramount
Rights to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 631 (1971); and Winters Doctrine
Rights-Keystone of National Program for Western Land and Water, Conservation and
Utilization, 26 MONT. L. REV. 149 (1965).
104. The reservations are the Chemehuevi, Cocoopah, Yuma, Colorado River and Fort
Mohave.
105. Bloom, supra note 60, at 672.
106. Hundley, supra note 25, at 9. 18.
107. 2 F. PURCHA, supra note 7, at 894.
108. Hundley, supra note 25, at 25.
109. See Loble, Interstate Water Compacts and Mineral Development (With Emphasis
on the Yellowstone River Compact), 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 777, 779 n.5 (1974), for
a list of the compacts.
110. E.g., Pub. L. No. 85-222, art. 10, 71 Stat. 497, 505 (1957) (Klamath River Basin
Compact); accord, Pub. L. No. 89-789, art. 13, 80 Stat. 1405, 1414 (1966) (Arkansas River
Basin Compact); ch. 73, art. 14, 64 Stat. 29, 34 (1950) (Snake River Compact). Some compacts do, however, charge Indian rights against the state in which the reservation is located.
E.g., ch. 73, art. 14, 64 Stat. 29, 34 (1950) (Snake River Compact).
111. Indian water rights were given considerable attention at the 1983 Bishop's Lodge
Conference to commemorate the first fifty years of the Colorado River Compact. See NEW
CouRsEs, supra note 25 especially the chapter written by Ingram, Scaff & Silko).
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Indians won big in Arizona v. California because the Special Master
ruled that the five reservations were entitled to an amount of water necessary "to irrigate the irrigable portions of the reserved lands' ' 1 2 and
awarded the Indians approximately 1,000,000 acre feet for 135,000 acres
as present perfected rights. The population of the basin was 23,658,000
in 1963 so "the Court's award to the Indians was 11,829 times greater
than to non-Indians." '" 3 Arizona opposed this ruling and tried to limit the
amount of water allocated to the tribes to protect the massive diversion
project, the Central Arizona Project, that would be necessary to use its
allocated share of the river. Arizona argued that either the reasonably
foreseeable needs of the reservation should be the standard or that the
doctrine of equitable apportionment should be applied. Under either
theory, prior uses would prevail over uncertain future uses. The majority
reaffirmed Winters and rejected Arizona's arguments. Two of the three
dissenters joined this portion of the Court's opinion "though not with some
misgivings regarding the amounts of water allocated to the Indian reservations."" 4
Circuit courts had previously applied the ultimate need standard,
although there was some precedent for an actual use standard,"5 but all
in all the Master's standard was a logical extension of prior cases. Just
as Winters looked to the future and not to the past, Arizona v. California
allocated Indian water rights with the Tribe's future needs in mind. Equitable apportionment was rejected because:
The doctrine of equitable apportionment is a method of resolving disputes between States.... An Indian reservation is not a
State. And while Congress has sometimes left Indian Reservations
considerable power to manage their own affairs, we are not convinced by Arizona's argument that each reservation is so much
like a state that its rights to water should be determined by the
doctrine of equitable apportionment. Moreover, even were we to
treat an Indian reservation like a state, equitable apportionment
would still not control since, under our view, the Indian claims
here are governed by the statutes and Executive Orders creating
the reservations.' 16
Arizona attempted to characterize the tribes as states so the doctrine
of equitable apportionment would apply. States could gain two advantages. Protection of existing uses would be the basis of equity and judicial
112. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596 (1963).
113. Letter from Richard Simms, Santa Fe, N.M. to author, Apr. 8, 1987 (copy on file
at Land & Water Law Review office).
114. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 603.
115. Compare Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908) with United
States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988,
rev'd on other grounds, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 988 (1956).
116. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 597. The argument was again rejected in an adjudication of Pueblo Indian rights in New Mexico. The court characterized the state's position as not one of ownership, but "to see that the rights to use water are apportioned to
the rightful owners under existing law." New Mexico ex reL Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F.
Supp. 993, 1005 (N.M. 1985).
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balancing could be used to compare the utility of Indian versus non-Indian
uses. These must be reciprocal sharing duties between the states and the
tribes, but the Court correctly declined to apply equitable apportionment
to achieve this objective. The Court recognized the possibility of treating
the tribes as sovereigns of comparable dignity to the states, and Western
states continue to press the equitable apportionment standard to limit
Winters. For this purpose, the analogy to tribes as states is not apt to
integrate reserved rights into interstate adjudications and compacts because it would unduly prejudice the tribes. The Supreme Court's reliance
on priority of use in equitable apportionment actions has, in most cases,
resulted in fair allocations among the states because all states have prior
uses, and existing junior and senior uses have been protected with relatively minor modifications of the strict enforcement of priorities. This is not
the case with respect to Indian rights. Equitable apportionment would
be inequitable.
Indian reserved rights are analytically different from state equitable
apportionment rights. Federal reserved rights are grounded in the property and treaty clauses of the constitution and not on Article III original
jurisdiction. Indian reserved rights rest on federal trust duties owed the
tribes, and courts have limited equitable discretion under the property
and treaty clauses to balance Indian and non-Indian rights compared to
the discretion that they have under Article III to develop a common law
of interstate rights.' 7 Indian water rights primarily look to the future
needs of the tribe to provide a resource base for tribal development. Rights
reserved prior to the priority date of a state right are paramount to all
subsequent state rights; Indian tribes are thus entitled to have all of their
rights satisfied before state priorities are distributed. This principle was
applied in Cappaertv. United States,"I a non-Indian reserved rights case,
to preclude any balancing between federal reserved and state rights. It
has also been applied to remind the Federal Regulatory Energy Commission (FERC) that when Congress requires the agency to condition a federal
power license to protect Indian water rights, " 9 FERC must impose the
conditions recommended by the Department of the Interior.2" It cannot
simply consult with the Department of the Interior. In subsequent litigation over the Indian rights recognized in Arizona u. California,the two
states again tried to characterize the tribes as states to preclude tribal
access to the Court, but, as discussed in Section V below, this effort was
rebuffed by the Supreme Court.
B. State Efforts to Limit Arizona v. California
Winters rights have long been characterized as a cloud on state-created
water rights. It is not surprising, therefore, that states have sought to
enhance the security of state water titles. States have sought to remove
117. Compare Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) with Colorado v. New Mexico I, 459 U.S. 176, 190 (1982) (Burger, J., concurring).
118. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
119. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1982).
120. Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 467 U.S. 1267
(1984); cf National Wildlife Fed'n v. FERC, 801 F.2d 1505 (9th Cir. 1986).
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the Winters cloud both by limiting the scope of the doctrine and by reducing Indian entitlements through quantification. Arizona v. CaliforniaI
suggests that all Indian rights must come off the top of state shares. Not
surprisingly, there has been great incentive to shift or avoid this responsibility, although the general applicability of the rule has not been confirmed. This section discusses the largely unsuccessful efforts to shift or
avoid responsibility for Winters rights. Section IV below deals with the
issue of representation of Indian tribes in water rights adjudications. Section V below describes largely the procedural relief provided by a series
of Supreme Court opinions since 1975. Section VI below discusses the
scope of Winters and quantification in the context of state-Indian water
deals.
1. Shifted Responsibility for the Satisfaction of Indian Claims.
In Arizona v. California, the Court recognized vast potential Indian
reserved rights, but did not specify how these rights are to be fulfilled
in non-congressional apportionments. Effected states have sought ways
to shift all or part of the responsibility to satisfy Indian claims. States
have taken the position that the fulfillment of Indian rights is a federal
or basin-wide responsibility. Some support for this theory can be found
in the Colorado Basin Project Act which declares that the Mexican Treaty obligation is a national obligation' and in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Nevada v. United States. 2 But, this argument works best
if there are surplus waters available to satisfy Indian claims,'2 3 the more
efficient uses of existing allocations are possible, or if augmentation from
outside a basin is a real possibility. On fully allocated streams, shifted
responsibility only begs the issue because federal or basin satisfaction of
Indian claims must come at the expense of state entitlements. Federal
or basin-wide responsibility can only shift the duty to satisfy Indian rights
among the basin states. For example, the basin-wide argument, which has
been made by Montana, seeks to force all states on the Missouri to share
Indian claims which are located primarily in Montana and the Dakotas.
Presumably this would mean that upstream flows and reservoir releases
'
could be withheld from downstream states to satisfy Indian claims. 1
Other theories have been proposed to limit Indian rights. Mineral industry spokesmen have argued that the government should be estopped
from asserting non-Indian reserved rights, 125 although the cases have con121. 43 U.S.C. § 1512 (1986). The federal assumption of the obligation is currently illusory as it depends on the augmentation of the Colorado.
122. 463 U.S. 100, 145 (1983). The issue was whether a decree could be reopened because
of inadequate Indian representation. The majority held that the decree could not be reopened
to promote the security of state water rights. Justice Brennan agreed but suggested that
the Tribe had a breach of trust action against the federal government.
123. Justice Brennan's analysis in his concurring opinion in United States v. Nevada,
463 U.S. 110, 146 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring), seems premised on the assumption that
the federal obligation can be met through unappropriated supplies or the imposition of better management practices on existing storage and diversion projects.
124. See Guhin, The Law of the Missouri, 30 S.D. L. REV. 346, 471 (1985).
125. Meshore, FederalReserved Rights Litigation, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1283,
1292-98 (1982).
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sistently rejected the application of estoppel against the federal government. 126 Even if estoppel applied against the federal government, the
theory does not apply to Indian water rights because there is less surprise than the states claim. The National Water Commission implicitly
rejected the estoppel theory, but the Commission did recommend as a matter of fairness that the federal government compensate water users who
are injured by the subsequent exercise of Indian rights.'
Compensation may be appropriate in a given case, but it should not
be adopted as a general policy. The federal government has induced reliance on the non-assertion of Indian water rights, but the reasonableness
of the reliance can be questioned. Through its historic reluctance to fund
Indian irrigation at the same rate as non-Indian irrigation and multipleuse projects, the federal government has encouraged states to risk the
subsequent assertion of Indian rights on the hope that they would be
marginal. Winters is over eighty years old and water lawyers could read
in Wiel's 1911128 edition "that the right of the reservation to water flowing through it, even in the absence of actual use thereon (if necessary for
use in the future), cannot be destroyed by private appropriators who first
put it to use under local law ... . even in States following the Colorado
doctrine which ignore the proprietary rights of the United States as
riparian proprietor in other aspects."
The fairest solution seems to be to treat Indian claims as analogous
to interstate waters allocated to another state by interstate compact. Two
consequences follow. First, Indian rights are assigned to the share, choate
or inchoate, of the state in which the reservation exists. Second, Hinderlider 29 applies and state water rights are subordinated to Indian water
rights just as state-created rights are subordinated to interstate compact
allocations. The water claimed pursuant to a state appropriation was never
126. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981); Federal Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S.
380 (1947). But cf United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986) (no relation back to date
of creation of reservation for non-Indian federal reserved rights when original application
did not specify the point of diversion).
127. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 481 (1973) states:
It has been the historic policy of the Federal Government to encourage
development of water resources by others, even though the supply was subject to Indian rights. For example, the United States entered into a contract
with the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California in 1933 for the
construction and operation of Parker Dam as the diversion point for the Colorado River Aqueduct, which was built by the District with a capacity of 1.3
million acre-feet per year at a cost to the District in excess of $200 million.
The Parker Dam Project was authorized and the delivery contract confirmed
by Congress in 1935. At that time, as Congress knew well, a number of Indian
Reservations had water rights in the mainstream of the Colorado River in an
amount not yet quantified at approximately 1 million acre-feet in Arizona v.
California and if the water is ever fully utilized by the Indians, the supply for
the Aqueduct will be substantially diminished. The Commission believes it is
unfair to deprive users of their water supply without compensation when Congress has supported investments in projects whose supply was subject to unused Indian rights.
128. 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 239 (3d ed. 1911).
129. Hinderlider v. La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
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unappropriated water in the first place. It is up to the state to decide how
state water rights will be adjusted to fulfill the compact obligation.
2. CongressionalRatification of Interstate Compacts
As a Waiver of Winters Rights.
States pin some hope on the theory that interstate compacts limit this
reading of Winters. There are two theories, but neither seems likely to
succeed for good reasons. The first argues that a compact is a contract
and thus the parties should be limited to Indian claims in actual use or
reasonably foreseeable at the time the compact was formed. The second
argues that congressional ratification of a compact estops the federal government from asserting any federal rights that might impair the state's
guaranteed share. 30 Arizona v. California implicitly rejected the first
theory by holding that Indian water rights are not limited to actual use,
equitable apportionment or compact adjudications. In addition, this principle is equally applicable to many state compacts which expressly exempt Indian and federal rights from the compact. The states assumed
the risk that compact allocations would be diminished.
There is some precedent for the proposition that a compact estops
Congress from subsequently modifying a compact by the assertion of a
federal interest, but it does not seem to be modern law. In Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 1 the Court held that a compact between states could not restrict the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. In Wheeling, Congress had retroactively authorized the construction of a bridge on the Ohio River between Virginia and Ohio. Pennsylvania, representing the upstream port of Pittsburgh, argued that the
legislation was inconsistent with a compact between Virginia and Kentucky that guaranteed free navigation on the Ohio. Confronted with the
question of whether a compact can limit the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, the Court answered: "Clearly not. Otherwise Congress and two States would possess the power to modify and alter the
constitution itself."' 32 The principle applies to the exercise of any federal
power. The compact limitation theory was urged in the recent litigation 3
to bar the federal government from using the Endangered Species Act
to require minimum flow releases from a proposed reservoir on the South
Platte River subject to a Section 404 dredge and fill permit. 34 The argument was rejected by the district court, "' but the 10th circuit found that

the issue was not ripe. 136

130. Comment, FederalReserved Rights and the Interstate Allocation of Water, XIII
L. REV. 813 (1978).

LAND & WATER

131. 59 U.S. 421 (1856).
132. Id. at 433.
133. See generally Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights,
XX LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1985).
134. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
135. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 586 (D. Colo. 1983).
136. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
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IV.

REPRESENTATION OF INDIAN TRIBES

The effective recognition and exercise of Winters rights can, in part,
be a function of who represents the tribe in adjudications and negotiations, especially after the revival of tribal sovereignty in the 1970's. Indian tribes may be represented by the federal government or they may
sue on their own behalf. Traditionally, the federal government has acted
as trustee for the tribes and asserted Indian water rights in interstate
allocation conflicts in which it has consented to joinder. Department of
the Interior representation of tribal interests created a conflict of interest
for the Department because it had to assert the rights of non-Indian
reclamation project right holders as well as those of the Indians. Increasingly, courts have recognized that Indians may intervene in water rights
adjudications and be represented by their own counsel.'7 The federal government can still participate in original actions as trustee.
States have no control over how the government chooses to discharge
this obligation. The major method of integration of Indian claims open
to the states is to adjudicate Indian and non-Indian reserved rights in
general adjudications that qualify for the McCarren Amendment waiver
of sovereign immunity. 3 ' States cannot, however, join the United States
in any capacity in equitable apportionment actions involving interstate
streams because the McCarren Act excludes United States joinder in these
cases.'

39

States themselves also clearly lack the power to represent tribal interests in equitable apportionments. State standing to invoke the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to apportion interstate waters is limited to
parenspatriaesuits. Parenspatriaerepresentation requires that the state
identify a quasi-sovereign interest to avoid the eleventh amendment's prohibition against suits against a state by citizens of another state. 4" The
Court has long held that state suits to protect its natural resources from
harm or adverse use by others, and to claim her fair share of common
resources, assert a quasi-sovereign power different from the exercise of
sovereign power over individuals and territory, or the vindication of state
proprietary interests."' An early Supreme Court case, Louisiana v.
Texas, 2 held that states cannot sue parens patriaeto vindicate federal
137. E.g., New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1976).
138. For a related article on this subject in this issue see White, McCarranAmendment
Adjudications-Problems,Solutions, Alternatives, XXII LAND & WATER L. REv. 619 (1987).
139. 43 U.S.C. § 666(c) (1982).

140. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900). The Court's latest reaffirmation of the
doctrine is Alfred L. Snapp & Son Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 609 (1982).
141. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). The Court seems to have
reduced quasi-sovereignty to a fiction in equitable apportionment actions. Colorado v. New
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (State may sue parens patriae to assert the claim of a single
potential water user). Nonetheless, the Court continues to adhere to the position that a state
must articulate an interest different from those of identified private parties. Alfred L. Snapp
& Sons Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
142. 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
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interests such as freedom of interstate commerce, and this principle would
seem to preclude the representation of tribal interests. State water right
holders would, of course, be bound by state-tribal negotiations as the state
is representing traditional state parens patriaeinterests when it acts to
protect state created rights.
Louisiana v. Texas held that Louisiana could not sue Texas parens
patriaeto contest a yellow fever quarantine alleged to interfere with commerce between the two states.' This limited view of state interests has
been eroded by the cases that allow one state to sue another to invalidate
a resource embargo'" and might even extend to tribal representation. Concurring in a recent case holding that Puerto Rico had standing to sue
Virginia apple growers for discriminating against Puerto Rican residents
recruited to pick apples on the mainland pursuant to the Wagner-Peyser
Act' 5 nationwide employment program, Justice Brennan observed that
he "can discern no basis either in the Constitution or in policy for denying.a State the opportunity to vindicate the federal rights of its citizens."'16
Broadly read, this analysis would encompass suits to vindicate Winters
rights because reservation Indians are both tribal members and citizens' 7
of the state in which they reside, but this result would be contrary to
federal Indian policy. The federal interest at stake in Snapp was better
defined by Justice White as the quasi-sovereign right of a state "in not
being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system. 1148
Arizona v. CaliforniaII 9 confirms the inability of the states to represent tribal claims. The five tribes awarded Winters rights sought to intervene in proceedings for the entry of a supplemental decree to Arizona
v. CaliforniaI to claim an additional 317,000 acre-feet for excluded qualifying lands. A supplemental decree was entered by the Special Master
confirming present perfected water rights on the river, and he allowed
143. Justice Fuller noted that Louisiana was not engaged in interstate commerce and
alleged no special injury to her property. Id at 19.
144. E.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 J1923).
145. Pub. L. No. 73-30, 48 Stat. 113 (1933) ch. 49 § 2 as added, Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96
Stat. 1322 (1982) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 49a-49L (1982 and Cum. Supp. 1986)).
146. Alfred L. Snapp & Sons Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 611 (1982).
147. Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982))
does not change this analysis. Indian country was originally beyond state jurisdiction, but
a confusing law of shared state, federal and tribal jurisdiction now exists. During the 1950s,
Congress began to terminate tribes on the assumption that Indians should be absorbed into
the states. One product of the termination era is Public Law 280, see generally Goldberg,

Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A.

L. REV. 535 (1975); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir.
1975), cert.denied, 429 U.S. 1038 11977), which codified a long history of piecemeal federal
grants of state jurisdiction over Indian tribes. Public Law 280 is a grant of state civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indians living on reservations in a variety of circumstances, subject to state acceptance and tribal consent in some cases. F. COHEN, supra note 22, at 362.
Clearly, Public Law 280 does not make Indians citizens of a state for all purposes and especially
for environmental and resource allocation jurisdiction, Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA,
752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (states have no RCRA jurisdiction over Indian lands), nor does
it permit states to speak for the tribes on water issues.
148. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
149. 460 U.S. 605 (1982).
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the tribes to intervene in subsequent hearings to determine the amount
of practicably irrigable acres. The states argued that tribal intervention
violated the eleventh amendment. There is some precedent for the state's
position, but even Justice Rehnquist affirmed the Special Master's order.
He offered two theories, one narrow and the other broad. The narrow
theory is that suit was initially brought by the federal government as
trustee for the tribes against the states. Suits by the federal 0government
against a state are not barred by the eleventh amendment."1 To counter
the states' argument that the Indians were adequately represented by
the federal government, the Court acknowledged more broadly that the
Indians had an interest in asserting their Winters rights "to take their
'
place as independent qualified members of the modern body politic." '
The newly affirmed right of self-representation will apply to future
allocations. Not until a federal court rebuked the government for not vigilantly defending Indian rights in 195452 did the federal government defer
to Indian definitions of Winters claims.'" Thus, the tribes may be bound
by prior decrees confirming the tribe's full Winters right, no matter how
inadequate it now seems, in which the federal government represents conflicting parties. Res judicata has been applied to confirm decrees where
a tribe was not a party because congressional delegation of dual responsibilities to the Department of the Interior absolves the government from
following the "fastidious standards of a private fiduciary ... "154 Preclusion against other parties to the decree does not, however, bar a breachof-trust suit against the government.'-' The right of independent recognition has been circumscribed by the Department of the Interior. After
United States v. Nevada, it stopped paying the fees of independent tribal
lawyers.
The privilege of the federal government to initiate original actions to
protect Indian water rights in interstate streams was substantially limited
in United States v. Nevada. 6 Leave to file an original action to declare
the rights of the Nevada and California, the Bureau of Reclamation and
Paiute Indian Tribe's rights into Pyramid Lake was denied. The Court
reasoned that the two states had allocated the Truckee River by proposed
interstate compact (which was not approved) so there was no interstate
150. "The Tribes do not seek to bring new claims or issues against the States, but only
ask leave to participate in an adjudication of their vital water rights that was commenced
by the United States." Id at 614.
151. Arizona v. California II, 460 U.S. at 615, quoting from Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil,
390 U.S. 365, 369 (1968) (quoting from Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705,
715 (1943)). The federal government's trust responsibilities, Hechman v. United States, 224
U.S. 413 (1912), have never been construed to foreclose Indians' rights to sue on their own
behalf to protect tribal resources from impairment, Creek Nation v. United States, 318 U.S.
629 (1943).
152. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 124 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wash. 1954),
rev'd 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
153. Bloom, supra note 60, at 692, regrets the failure of the United States to exercise
independent judgment.
154. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983).
155. Id at 145 (Brennan, J., concurring).
156. 412 U.S. 534 (1972).
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dispute; only a dispute between the federal government and the states
existed. For this reason the Court thought it doubtful that there was a
ripe dispute between California and the federal government over Pyramid
Lake, and it ordered the litigation to proceed in federal district court in
Nevada where all parties with an immediate interest could best be heard." 57
United States v. Nevada, combined with the McCarren Amendment retention of sovereign immunity for equitable apportionment actions, presents
the states with limited options to quantify Indian rights in interstate conflicts.
By JUDICIAL LIMITATION
The major legal problem with the rule that states are responsible for
the satisfaction of Indian rights out of their share of interstate rivers and
aquifers is that states have limited influence over Indian tribes. States
cannot speak for Indian tribes in adjudications, compact negotiations and
in other allocation forums. Federal Indian law generally precludes the
states from defining Indian water rights for on-reservation use and from
limiting the exercise and administration of Winters rights, except as to
off-reservation uses. The states may negotiate with Indian tribes, but the
Indians' legal position is defined by federal law so if the tribe does not
validly waive its claims, states are limited to deciding how state-created
rights will be reduced to satisfy Indian claims. Led by now Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Supreme Court has rendered several major decisions in
the past fifteen years that reduce the risk of disruption of existing state
rights, but the risk that state water right holders will be bumped at some
future date remains.
Pressure for the limitations of Winters rights stems from Arizona v.
Californiaand the bold claims pushed by Indian tribes during the Indian
rights movement that began in the 1970s. Indian water claims have expanded beyond their original limited purpose-irrigation-and now consist both of claims for instream uses and claims for M & I (Municipal and
Industrial) uses. In the 1970s, in response, non-Indian Western water users
pinned their hopes on two sources, a narrow reading of Winters and on
quantification.
Some argued that Indian water uses were confined to on-reservation
subsistence uses.""5 In the 1950s and 1960s, legislation was introduced
V.

INTEGRATION OF INDIAN RIGHTS

157. The Court did suggest that the United States would appear to have occasion to
object to upstream diversions in California on the grounds of interference with its Pyramid
Lake water rights only if the compact between the two states is not approved or Nevada,
prior to such approval, disowns the agreed-upon division of Truckee River water. In that
event, a dispute between the two states may arise, and the United States would then perhaps
have some ground to participate and assert that California's share must be reduced in order
to accommodate a prior, long-established use by the United States in the State of Nevada.
Id. at 539.
158. Palma, Considerationsand Conclusions Concerning the Transferability of Indian

Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 901 (1980). The limitation theories are criticized in

Veeder, Water Rights in the Coal Fields of the Yellowstone River Basin, 40 LAW & CON-

PROBs. 77, 89-91 (1976). Some support for this position can be found in the Hawaii
Supreme Court's opinion in Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57 (1983), cert.denied,
105 S. Ct. 216 (1985).
TEMP.
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in Congress to limit non-Indian federal reserved rights. 5 9 Indian rights
were not included in the various federal water rights settlement bills. In
the 1970s, as the energy boom took off, proposals were made to limit Indian rights forever through quantification,'"0 but understandably the tribes
have not been enthusiastic. 6 Historically, water adjudication has meant
only toting up existing uses. The Carter administration undertook a major quantification initiative' 6' and quantification remains the Department
of Justice's first priority with regard to Indian water rights. The projected
costs of quantification have, however, chilled enthusiasm since 1978. Thus,
Indian rights remain inchoate in many instances and may remain so in
the foreseeable future. Also, Indian water rights problems increasingly
will be harder to solve because the augmentation of existing waters will
be more limited. The federal government is no longer going to build the
massive multiple-purpose dams and inefficient irrigation projects for Indians and non-Indians that characterized the Reclamation Era. Reclamation in the future will be based on cost sharing, and this rule will make
Indian use even more difficult.
Arizona v. California created the present-day Winters cloud on
Western water titles by applying the "practicably irrigable acreage" standard. Practicable irrigated acreage gives Indians a property right and thus
provides the necessary condition for an immediate water market, but the
standard has not served the best interests of the tribes. Irrigable acreage
as a standard for Indian water rights is an unfortunate legacy of the assimilation period. It allows the Indians to claim large amounts of water,
but is has also induced the Western states to try and limit reservations
to small, irrigated gardens. Irrigable acreage is often unresponsive to nonagricultural reservation development or to cultural-based water claims.
It also forces the wasteful use of water as Indians-although not subject
to the use it or lose it rule-have to develop irrigation projects to assert
credible claims or find lessees. The Navajo Indian Irrigation project is
a prime example. Indian tribes have sought to avoid the limitations of
the standard by asserting aboriginal claims for instream uses such as
fishing, or have used potential irrigable acreage as a bargaining chip to
win a wide range of rights and concessions in specific negotiations. Unfortunately, although practicable irrigated acreage is not the only possible Winters standard, no satisfactory substitute has emerged. Not surprisingly, the inherently inflated nature of the standard has met with fierce
resistance in the West. The resistance has taken three main forms: (1) efforts to limit the amount of qualifying acreage and (2) efforts to apply
159. Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-StateConflicts over
Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 33 (1968).
160. See Note, IndianReserved Water Rights: The Winters of Our Discontent,88 YALE
L.J. 1689 (1979); Comment, FederalReserved Rights in Water: The Problem of Quantification, 9 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 89 (1977); Note, A Proposalfor the Quantificationof Reserved
Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1974).
161. See J. FOLK-WILLIAMS, WHAT INDIAN WATER MEANS TO THE WEST (1982).
162. See R. FOREMAN, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS: A PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE
POLICY MESS 36-47, 76-82 (1981). The author places Carter Administration Indian water policy
in the context of earlier quantification efforts.
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an appurtenancy standard to Indian reservations to lock tribes into
marginal irrigation, and (3) efforts to deny Indians access to federal
forums. The Supreme Court has addressed the first and third issues.
After a period of liberal expansion of the reserved rights doctrine, the
Supreme Court began to curb both Indian and non-Indian reserved rights
in a series of decisions that started in 1971 and picked up steam after
1976. United States v. DistrictCourtfor Eagle County16 3 started the limitation era. Eagle County grew out of efforts by Western Colorado water
users to limit Denver's historic appetite for Western slope water by forcing the United States to claim sufficient reserved rights for its forests
and parks to foreclose future transbasin diversions. The issue was whether
the McCarran Amendment's waiver of sovereign immunity in state general
adjudication suits includes claims for federal reserved Indian and nonIndian water rights. The government's argument that the McCarren
Amendment applies only to rights acquired under state law was correctly rejected as "extremely technical" and the Amendment was applied to
reserved rights. 6' Five years later, Eagle County was expressly extended to Indian water rights in ColoradoRiver Water ConservationDistrict
v. United States.' Justice Brennan initially concluded that McCarren
Amendment and state jurisdiction are concurrent and that the abstention doctrine does not preclude federal jurisdiction. But, after eliminating
the usual reasons for a federal court to defer to state jurisdiction, he added a new reason. Justice Brennan stated that it is sometimes proper for
a federal district court to dismiss the federal action to allow Indian reserved rights to be adjudicated in parallel proceedings for reasons of "wise
judicial administration."'6 6
State courts must still apply federal substantive law, but Colorado
River Water ConservationDistrict'snovel theory of federal deference to
state proceedings' 7 law has been justifiably criticized because it exposes
Indians to the risk of state court bias contrary to the general thrust of
federal Indian law which is to protect Indians from state regulation that
threatens tribal integrity. 68 Justice Brennan fully recognized the force
of these arguments, but he reaffirmed and extended Colorado River in
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona.'" The Tribe brought an action in
federal court to assert its rights to the upper Salt River and the action
was promptly dismissed.'76 This Colorado River dismissal was reversed
163. 401 U.S. 520 (1971). The same result was reached in a parallel case, United States
v. District Ct. in and for Water Div. No. 5,401 U.S. 527 (1971).
164. Eagle County, 401 U.S. at 525.
165. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
166. Id at 818.
167. Comment, FederalCourts Stays and Dismissals in Deference to ParallelState Court
Proceedings:The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. Cui. L. REV. 641 (1977).
168. Abrams, Reserved WaterRights, IndianRights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal
Jurisdiction:The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1141-46 (1978). For a recent articulation of the Court's preemption analysis, see Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 106 S. Ct. 2305 (1986).
169. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
170. In re Determination of Conflicting Rights to Use Water from Salt River above
Granite Reef Dam, 484 F. Supp. 778 (D. Ariz. 1980).
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by the Ninth Circuit which held that the enabling act admitting Arizona
to the union precluded state court jurisdiction over Indians."' Arizona's
enabling act, as does those of most Western states, 17 disclaimed ownership of, and jurisdiction over, Indian reservations, but Justice Brennan
found that the McCarren Amendment was a waiver of "whatever
limitation ' '171 the federal government placed on state jurisdiction. The Indian tribe also argued that stronger considerations of protection of Indian interests applied to suits initiated by tribes, but the policies of judicial
administration and comity underlying Colorado River were found applicable to suits brought by the Indians on their own behalf.74 In principle, ColoradoRiver is wrong and probably is a sport in federal jurisdiction, but it operates to confine Indians to state courts in most water
adjudications. In practice, the effect of ColoradoRiver may be over-exaggerated as the substance of Winters rights are much more important than
the forum of their adjudication. 7 '
Still, ColoradoRiver and San Carlos Apache place the tribes at a great
disadvantage. Although they may participate in adjudications on their
own behalf, they cannot shuck off the federal government's participation
because only Congress can terminate the trust. 176 Thus, if the tribes fail
171. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1982). The same result
was reached in a similar suit in Montana. Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Northern Cheyenne
Indian Reservation v. Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982).
172. Justice Brennan cited the acts for nine states, and he noted that Wyoming and Idaho,
which were admitted without prior enabling acts, inserted similar disclaimers into their state
constitutions. San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 561 n.12.
173. 563 U.S. at 564.
174. The latest chapter in the litigation is United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,
784 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1986), which holds that the tribal court was without power to enjoin
officials of the Department of the Interior from collecting information to act as trustee for
the tribe in the state adjudication. The tribe characterized the federal government's assertion of its claim as "fraudulent." Accord, United States v. Yakima Tribal Ct., 806 F.2d 853
(9th Cir. 1986).
175. Some federal jurisdiction survives. Colorado River does not apply to original actions, Ranquist, supra note 63, at 709-10, and federal courts have retained jurisdiction in
isolated instances where a strong state interest in a comprehensive adjudication was absent. The cases include Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d
1032 (9th Cir. 1985) (federal court retained jurisdiction over tribal claim in conflict with nonIndian irrigators' rights to water from a federal reclamation project, notwithstanding pending state general adjudication because federal suit was not general adjudication but attempt
to interpret 1945 federal consent decree as to the reclamation project); United States v. Adair,
723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983) (federal court decided what Indian water rights survived termination of tribe and sale of its land, but deferred quantification and administration issues to state proceedings); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3009 (D.
Ariz. 1985) (federal court took jurisdiction over charges of discrimination under the Administrative Procedure Act against Secretary of the Interior for excluding Indian lands from
participating in federal reclamation project, but ruled that tribe's water rights claimed under
Winters and under state law had to be resolved in state court); United States v. BluewaterToltec Irrigation Dist., 580 F. Supp. 1434 (D.N.M. 1984) (federal court, where Indian water
adjudication was pending, refused to remove state Indian water rights adjudication).
176. The source of the modem doctrine that the federal government's plenary power
over Indians gives the government the power to bind Indians regardless of whether they
are represented in the litigation is Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912). The trust
relationship continues to give the federal government the power to bind non-represented tribal
interests, but Heckman's suggestion that the government's discharge of its trust duties is
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to participate in state adjudications, they may forfeit their claims because
state adjudications, including Indian claims, may be counted in subsequent equitable apportionment actions.'77
Indians rights have been further limited by the zealous application
of res judicata to Indian claims in two cases. Arizona v. California II refused to apply a section of the original decree to allow the Indians to claim
additional potentially irrigable acreage. United States v. Nevada held that
federal representation of Indians bound the tribe to a decree despite allegations that Indian rights were compromised by a conflict of interest. In
Arizona v. CaliforniaI, the Indians were given a quantification standardpracticable irrigable acreage-but in Arizona v. CaliforniaII,'"I the Court
refused to exercise its discretion, allowed in the 1964 decree, to reopen
the decree to decide if more acres qualified for water rights. The 1964
decree was nonetheless made final because the fundamental principles of
res judicata and collateral estoppel, although not technically applicable,
demanded final water decrees. Res judicata was applied to prior decrees
in United States v. Nevada in the face of the argument that Indian claims
were not adequately represented because of a conflict of interest on the
part of the federal government. Justice Rehnquist found that the conflict
was congressionally sanctioned.
A non-Indian federal reserved rights opinion by Justice Rehnquist also
may limit Winter's claims. United States v. New Mexico 7 ' held that the
United States Forest Service may not claim reserved rights for instream
flows because these rights serve secondary not primary purposes of the
original reservation legislation.' 80 Whatever its merits for public lands,
the primary-secondary distinction should not be applied to Indian water
8
rights, although at least one court has assumed that it does apply.1 '
VI. STATE-INDIAN DEALS

States have consistently assumed that Indian reserved water rights
must be satisfied from state compact or equitable apportionment allocations when they have negotiated specific agreements with individual
tribes. 812 States may claim that these specific agreements do not amount
unreviewable has been rejected by the Court. See Arizona v. California II, 460 U.S. 605,
649-52 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the current law).
177. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 784 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1986). This
analysis is enforced in the companion case of White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 784
F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1986), which chastises the Tribe for continuing to assert federal court
jurisdiction after San Carlos Apache and holds that all charges of trustee mismanagement
must be raised in the state proceeding. Accord, Blackfeet Indian Nation v. Hodel, 634 F.
Supp. 646 (D. Mont. 1986).
178. 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
179. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
180. "[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether a particular use is primary or secondary but
whether it is completely outside the scope of the reservation's purposes." F. COHEN supra
note 22, at 584.
181. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied 106
S. Ct. 1183 (1986). The court applied the standard to expand reservation homeland uses from
agriculture to hunting and fishing.
182. Clyde, InstitutionalResponse to ProlongedDrought, in NEW CouRsEs, supranote
25, at 131.
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to a consistent principle. The recognition of legitimate claims to state
shares has been so consistent, however, that an analogy between these
agreements and custom as a basis for international law is appropriate.
can be evidence of customary law, although the issue
International treaties
3
is a complex one.'
This section examines four state-Indian agreements. Two are early
agreements and illustrate the pressures that operate on Indian tribes to
waive or defer their Winters claims. Two are recent agreements that comprehensively address tribal water needs and attempt to integrate potential Indian uses with state water rights administration.
A. Navajo-New Mexico Agreement
To gain participation in New Mexico's use of water stored behind
Navajo Dam on the San Juan River, the Navajo Tribe participated in the
Colorado Storage Project Act which authorized a state project,"' the San
Juan-Chama, and the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project.'85 The Tribe
waived its Winters' rights in return for a diversion of 508,000 acre feet
for a 100,630 acre project. The benefits of this 1962 bargain are still to
be fully realized. Tribal relocation of some its members caused great internal bitterness. The project, which started receiving water in the late
1970s, has been funded at much slower rate than the state project. Also,
the Navajo Project initially lost money, in part, because of Indian inexperience with large-scale irrigation.",8 After the construction of the initial
phase of the project, the Navajos have taken a more aggressive view of
their water needs and rights. The Tribe recently assumed management
of the project. A major unresolved issue is whether the Navajo Irrigation Project Act is a waiver of the Tribe's full Winters rights.'87 If there
is a waiver it may only be partial. For example, New Mexico takes the
position that the Tribe waived only its rights to waters stored in the Navajo reservoir and the upstream reach and tributaries of the San Juan. 88
This leaves the Tribe free to claim non-associated groundwater, the Colorado mainstem in Arizona and Utah and the San Juan Basin in Arizona
and Utah."8 9 Other tribal claims, of course, remain unaffected by the act.'
183. M. AKEHURST, A

MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

26 (4th ed. 1982).

184. Price & Weatherford, Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practice:Navajo Experience in the ColoradoRiver Basin, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 119-27 (1976).

185. 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1980).
186. P. FRADKIN, supra note 103, at 170-72.
187. The arguments pro and con are analyzed in DuMars & Ingrain, CongressionalQuantification of Indian Reserved Water Rights: A Definitive Solution or Mirage? 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 17 (1980).
188. Id at 38-39.
189. See Black & Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug on the ColoradoRiver,
20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71, 86-89 1980), for a discussion of the subsequent agreement between the Navajo Tribe and the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power
District for the use of Arizona's 50,000 acre feet share of the Colorado River above Lee's
Ferry as an upper as well as lower basin state in the Navajo Generating Station near Page,
Arizona on subsequent Navajo claims.
190. For example the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, which has claims adverse to the Navajos,
successfully enjoined the transfer of water from a tributary of the San Juan to the Elephant
Butte Reservoir on the Lower Rio Grande River for future municipal use by Albuquerque
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B. Ute-Utah Agreement
In Utah, the Ute Tribe agreed to defer their Winters claims, which
have an 1861 priority date, that threatened Utah's share of the Colorado
which the state is putting to use through as much of the Central Utah
Project (CUP) as the federal government and the citizens of Utah will fund.
The Indians had undeveloped potentially irrigable acres but no prospect
of putting much of the water to use. With Bureau of Reclamation consent,' 91 the Indians promised not to develop 15,242 acres until 2005. The
deferral agreement permitted construction of the Bonneville Unit of CUP
which supplies existing non-Indians uses, which may eventually be displaced by ultimate Indian development, and to export water to Salt Lake
City and other areas of the Great Basin. The quid pro quo for the Indians
was the promise of water from the last stage of CUP.
The Indian priority was not assigned to the Central Utah Water Conservancy District; "[tihe Indians simply agreed not to develop these lands
until 2005. '"1"2 The Indians can use the CUP water for municipal and industrial purposes. According to the dean of Western water lawyers, Edward Clyde, Utah is not trying to interfere with the way the Indians will
use their water, but is asserting the right to determine for itself how it
will use the non-Indian part of the water apportioned to Utah under the
two Colorado River Compacts.193 This is an insufficient explanation of the
agreement, however, because both congressional and tribal approval are
necessary."' More generally, the Ute deferral agreement shows the weakness of attempts at quick Winters fixes. CUP lags far behind schedule
and many Indian water rights issues remain unresolved.si A new agreement, the Ute Indian Water Compact, has been negotiated by a specially
created state legislative commission, but the Indians have not yet ratified
it and are seeking a new agreement. 96 The Indians were promised 480,000
acre feet to the head waters of the Green River which they are unlikely
to be able to put to use on their reservation. 197
through water exchanges. The trial court found that by the time that Albuquerque exchanged
the water to downstream users in return for increasing upstream groundwater pumping,
ninety-three percent of the water would be lost to evaporation. Thus, the proposed use was
too speculative to be beneficial. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 657 F.2d 1126 (10th
Cir. 1981).
191. Bureau of Reclamation Contract No. 14-06-W-194 (Sept. 20, 1965) (copy on file in
Land & Water Law Review office).
192. Clyde, Special ConsiderationsInvolving Indian Rights, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW.
237, 251 (1975).
193. Id.
194. F. COHEN, supra note 22, at 594 n.122. Congress has recognized the agreement in
the Colorado River Storage Project Act. 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1982) set a completion date for
a planning report for the Ute Indian unit of the CUP, which was described as to "enable
the United States to meet the commitment heretofore made to the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation under the agreement dated September 20, 1965."
195. Boyden, Use of Indian Water in Developing Mineral Properties,Water Acquisition
ForMineralDevelopmen4 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. Inst., Tucson, Ariz. (Mar. 16-17, 1978).
196. Getches, supra note 3. The compact does not, inter alia, offer the Indians an assurance
of delivery of stored water beyond that provided by the Deferral Agreement. C. MARSEILLE,
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: NEGOTIATING INDIAN WATER RIGHTS 21-22 (Western Nat. Resources
Pol'y Series No. 102 1983).
197. Clyde, supra note 182, at 130.
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C. Fort Peck-Montana Compact
Montana has the most comprehensive state approach to Indian claims
and has been the most generous to the Indians. Starting in 1973, the state
has enacted a large amount of legislation to give the state the maximum
leverage in the future allocation of the waters from its three headwater
basins, the Clarks Fork of the Columbia, the Missouri and the Yellowstone.
The grand strategy includes a statewide water right adjudications program. It also includes a water development program balanced by a water
reservation program and a state mechanism to define federal and Indian
water rights.'"" In 1979, the legislature created a State Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission to negotiate compacts with Montana
tribes. 99
Montana is the first Western state to enter into a "compact" with
an Indian tribe for the purpose of quantifying the tribe's Winters right.
In 1985, the State Reserved Rights Compact Commission and the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation concluded the Fort
Peck Montana Water Compact. The legal status of this state-Indian compact approach is unclear. Texas v. New Mexico0 0 characterized congressional approval of an interstate compact as an exercise of the congressional power recognized in Arizona v. Californiato apportion an interstate
river. Thus, a state cannot unilaterally enter into a compact with a tribe.
Congressional consent is necessary to make the compact binding.20 ' In
addition, all Indian agreements must be approved by the federal government as trustee for the tribes.
Montana's state-Indian "compacts" are not in fact traditional compacts. The state has attempted to create a new species of agreement that
is approved by Congress but not as a compact." 2 Because downstream
Missouri states, which have to date been unable to agree on an overall
allocation of the Missouri, 0 3 would oppose a congressionally approved com198. See generally Ladd, Federaland Interstate Conflicts In Montana Water Law: Support For a State Water Plan, 42 MONT. L. REV. 267 (1981).
199. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-702 (1985).
200. 462 U.S. 554 (1983).
201. Edward Clyde has expressed doubt about this proposition:
I do not think the states can obligate the Indians by an interstate compact, even though consented to by Congress. They were given the land and
the water to meet the needs of those lands which were susceptible of irrigation, as of the time the reservation was created. The priority is the date the
reservation was created. At that time the states had a common-law right to
an equitable share of an interstate stream; and while the extent of that right
only becomes quantified by a compact, by a court decision, or by congressional
apportionment, the right itself predates the actual quantification.
Clyde, supra note 182, at 131.
202. Telephone conversation with Mr. John E. Thorson, Doney & Thorson, Helena, Mont.,
Apr. 16, 1987.
203. One manifestation of the suspicion among the states that has so far prevented any
interstate consensus on the allocation of the river is the suit by the downstream states to
invalidate a contract (now terminated) between the Bureau of Reclamation and the state
of South Dakota for 20,000 acre feet of water stored behind the Oahe Reservoir near Pierre,
South Dakota. South Dakota planned to market the water to the now defunct ETSI coal
slurry pipeline. The Eight Circuit erroneously held that the the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
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pact. Montana has therefore proposed legislation that would authorize
the BIA to permit off-reservation marketing. This would allow the state
and the Department of the Interior to agree, but downstream states would
seem unaffected by the compact. The deal, therefore, could be reopened
in a subsequent equitable apportionment or compact negotiation. As of
mid-1987, no member of Montana's congressional delegation has introduced the proposed legislation.
This unique state-Indian agreement can best be understood in the context of Montana's forward-looking water management and planning program.20 4 With respect to the Missouri basin, a 1983 study commissioned
by the state done by Wright Water Engineers and the late Dean Frank
J. Trelease °5 recommended that the state prepare for an eventual allocation of the Missouri. However, as a headwaters state in the post-Reclamation era, Montana has wisely chosen not to base its entire water management strategy on the traditional Western theory of "use it or lose it."
The grand strategy of the state seems to be to complement its statefinanced water development program with the reservation of large quantities of water and to cut generous deals with the several Montana tribes
to count these non-traditional uses in a future equitable apportionment
action or compact negotiation." 6 The ultimate success of this strategy
will depend on Montana's ability to convince the Supreme Court to defer
to the state's future-oriented water management policy. Incorporation of
non-consumptive uses and future reservations into the Court's equitable
apportionment formula runs against the anti-speculative tradition in
Western water law and will require a maj or expansion of current doctrine
20 7
which looks almost exclusively to the past.
The Montana-Fort Peck Compact purports to determine "finally and
forever" all of the water rights of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of
the reservations. For the first time, the Compact integrates ground and
surface rights and expressly allows off as well as on-reservation uses. May
1, 1888, the date of the legislative creation of the reservation, is the priority
date and the Indians are allocated 1,050,476 acre feet of Missouri River
water and its tributaries except the over-appropriated Milk (the site of
Winters) to support 525,236 acre feet of consumptive uses. Consistent with
Winters, Compact rights may not be lost by non-use. Water duty is set
at 0.8 acre feet per year and 0.48 for full and partial service irrigation.
has the exclusive authority to market water stored behind Pick-Sloan projects. Missouri v.
Andrews, 787 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1986), US. appealpending (1986). South Dakota has also
pursued an original action in the Supreme Court. See supra note 34.
204. MONTANA'S WATER PLANNING PROGRAM: A REPORT TO THE FORTY-NINTH SESSION
OF THE MONTANA LEGISLATURE (Jan. 1985).
205. A Water Protection Strategy for Montana-Missouri River Basin (1983) (copy on
file in Land & Water Law Review office).
206. The best explanation of Montana's current thinking about the Missouri is M.
O'KEEFE, N. SLOCUM, D. SNOW, J. THORSON & P. VANDENBERG, BOUNDARIES CARVED IN
WATER: AN ANALYSIS OF RIVER AND WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE UPPER MISSOURI BASIN

25-27 (Northern Lights Inst. 1986).
207. This argument rests on the suggestion in Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. 310
(1984) that comprehensive state water planning may justify the recognition of future needs
in an equitable apportionment.
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Surface diversions are limited to 950,000 acre feet; the balance of 100,472
acre feet must be made up from groundwater pumping. The Compact
negotiators agreed in 1982 that 487,763 acres on the reservation were
potentially irrigable, although only about one half are owned by tribes
or individual Indians. 08 There are six seasonable or monthly caps on the
amount of water that can be withdrawn from the Missouri during that
period.
Montana obtained two concessions, both of which were relatively easy
for the tribes to make. First, pre-existing state and federal uses are protected by subordinating the Compact (and Winters) priority dates to these
uses with the exception of Indian stock watering and domestic uses. The
amounts of water dedicated to these uses are not great. There are approximately 19,500 acres in full service irrigation and an additional 13,000 acres
are irrigated when water flows are high, with a combined consumptive
use of about 41,000 acre feet a year. Most are supplied by groundwater.
The second concession deals with two related complicated issues of
Indian law, whether Indian water rights can be transferred off the reservation for any use that a tribe may decide, and the power of a tribe to
control off reservation uses of its waters. The Compact gives the tribes
the right to sell or lease water for use outside the reservation in or out-ofstate. Consistent with Indian law,20 9 the tribes alone may authorize offreservation uses, but the Compact imposes conditions on Indian resource
sovereignty. At least one-hundred eighty days notice must be given to
the state of any proposed off-reservation transfer, off-reservation uses are
limited to beneficial uses recognized under state law, out-of-state uses are
subject to state export restrictions and the state, which has water
marketing authority, must be given the opportunity to participate in a
joint tribal-state water marketing deal. Montana has recently embraced
water marketing as a way to retain control of its water after Sporhase
v. Nebraska,"'o and it has agreed to a reciprocal notice duty on proposed
out-of-state uses. The Compact's limitations on off-reservation uses are
an effort to control the use of water for coal slurry pipelines, if any state
power to ban exports survives after Sporhase.2 '
208. FINAL REPORT OF TRIBAL NEGOTIATING TEAM TO FORT PECK TRIBAL EXECUTIVE
BOARD 14 (Apr. 19, 1985) (copy on file in Land & Water Law Review office).
209. States are generally precluded from regulating the management of natural resources
on a reservation, Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), even where federal law
authorizes state primacy, Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir 1985).
Tribal regulation of non-Indian uses on the reservation and off is more complex. Compare
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981) with United States v.
Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984). For a good discussion of existing tribal water management programs, see Schupe, Water in Indian Country: From PaperRights to a Managed
Resource, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 561, 579-92 (1986).
210. 458 U.S. 941 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-141 (1985). For a complete analysis
of the genesis of the state's water marketing program, see FORTY-NINTH LEGISLATURE, STATE
OF MONTANA, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON WATER MARKETING (1985).
211. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-201 (1985). Article III K-4 provides:
If otherwise authorized by federal law, the Tribes may enter into an agreement
with any person who is exercising or proposing to exercise a right under the
laws of the State to use surface water outside the Reservation on any tributary
of the Missouri River that flows through or adjacent to the Reservation,
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In addition to allocating a substantial amount of the flow of the
Missouri River (just as it leaves the state) to the Indians, the state has
also tried to integrate Indian uses into other state water policies. Montana can afford to do this because the Missouri has surplus flows in the
state. This integration of state and Indian rights stands in marked contrast to other states which have historically viewed all Indian uses as inconsistent with state rights. However, integration is accomplished at the
expense of Indian rights because tribal instream flows may foreclose other
reservation uses. Thus, the success of Montana's experiment remains open.
The state has yet to set reserved flows for the mainstem of the Missouri,
but it intends to do so by using Indian instream flows to complement the
state's instream flow maintenance policies212
D. Colorado-Ute Settlement
The State of Colorado, the Ute Mountain, Ute Indian and Southern
Ute tribes, the federal government, various Colorado towns, special districts and canal companies negotiated an extensive settlement agreement
in 1986.213 The purpose is to remove the major barrier to the state's long
sought after Animas-La Plata Project and to settle claims in the event
that the project is not funded.114 Basically, the two tribes received a conexcept the mainstem of the Milk River, which agreement allows such person's
diversion and use and protects it from any other exercise of the Tribal Water
Right provided, however, that:
(a) before use of such water, the person shall have complied with all applicable state laws concerning the acquisition of a water right;
(b) subsequent to acquisition of the state water right, regulation of its
use shall be subject to state law;
(c) the amount of water subject to the agreement shall be considered a
consumptive use of the Tribal Water Right;
(d) the agreement shall not permanently alienate the Tribal Water Right
or any part thereof.
The Tribes may transfer annually only the following amounts of water for consumptive use outside the Reservation:
(a) 50,000 acre-feet;
(b) plus 35 percent of any amount over 200,000 acre-feet but less than
300,000 acre-feet authorized by state law to be transferred annually by the
State from waters within the State;
(c) plus 50 percent of any amount over 300,000 acre-feet authorized by
state law to be transferred annually by the State from waters within the State.
Transfers of the Tribal Water Right shall not be considered as part of any
amounts authorized by state law to be transferred annually by the State.
212. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-201 (1985). Article III L-1 provides:
1. At any time within five years after the effective date of this Compact
the Tribes may establish a schedule of instream flows to maintain any fish
or wildlife resource in those portions of streams, excluding the mainstreams
of the Milk River, which are tributaries of the Missouri River that flow through
or adjacent to the Reservation. These instream flows shall be a part of the Tribal
Water Right with a priority date of May 1, 1888. Water remaining in a stream
to maintain instream flows pursuant to such a schedule should be counted by
the Tribes as a consumptive use of surface water.
213. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement (Dec. 10, 1986) (copy
on file in Land & Water Law Review office).
214. This project was authorized by the Colorado River Storage Project Act, Pub. L.
No. 87-483, 70 Stat. 105 (1962) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1982), as amended by the Colorado River Basin Act, Pub. L. No. 96-375, 82 Stat. 896 (1980).
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firmed reserved right to water from two proposed projects, the Dolores
and the Animas-La Plata, with an 1868 priority, but the right "shall for
all time be subordinated to all water rights decreed and senior" to the
projects. 215 Project priorities are shared between the tribes and other users
on a pro rata basis. In return for subordination, the tribes were promised
delivery systems from the project and wet water deliveries for M & I in
addition to agricultural uses.116 Federal reclamation projects now require
expanded cost-sharing. The non-federal tab for the Animas-La Plata Project is $212 million out of a total cost of 572.8 million dollars, and the tribal
share is 60.5 million dollars.217 The Colorado legislature has appropriated
six million dollars for the tribal development fund, and the Colorado River
Water Resources Power and Development Fund will kick in another thirty million dollars.21
Colorado's settlement differs markedly from New Mexico and Utah's
settlements because the Indians were able to secure numerous protections
in the event the proposed projects are not completed as planned and in
the time planned. For example, if the Animas La Plata and delivery canals
are completed by 2000, the settlement becomes final and no additional
reserved rights may be claimed. If project does not materialize:
(ii) If Ridges Basin Reservoir, Long Hollow Tunnel, and the Dry
Side Canal to the turnout to the Dry Side Lateral are not completed so as to enable the delivery of water to the Tribe as described in this subsection by January 1, 2000, then by January
1, 2005, the Tribe, in consultation with the United States as
trustee, must elect either: (a) to retain the project reserved water
right; or (b) to commence litigation or renegotiation of its pending
reserved water rights claims on the Animas and La Plata Rivers.
If the Tribe, in consultation with the United States as trustee,
has not elected to commence litigation or renegotiation of its pending claims on the Animas and La Plata Rivers by notification to
the parties by January 1, 2005, as provided below, then: (a) the
Tribe shall be deemed to have elected to retain its project reserved
water right; (b) the settlement of the Tribe's pending reserved and
appropriative water rights claims on the Animas and La Plata
Rivers contained in this Agreement shall become final; and (c) the
Tribe shall not be entitled to claim any additional reserved water
rights either on the Animas River or on the La Plata River. If the
Tribe elects to commence litigation or renegotiation of its pending
reserved water rights claims on the Animas and La Plata Rivers
then the Tribe shall relinquish and forfeit the project reserved
215. Art. III A.1 (Dolores Project), A.2 (Animas-La Platal.
216. Id Art. III A.2 C provides that the tribes and other users will have M & I uses
satisfied first and agricultural allocation-spelled out in detail in the agreement-will be shared
on a pro rata basis.
217. 1986 COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCEs REPORT 8.
218. Art. VI.
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water right from the Animas-La Plata Project as described in this
subsection.19
VII. CONCLUSION
The major recommendation of this article is that the states stop their
judicial efforts to limit Indian water rights. There is a need to limit
Winters, but judicial attacks are counter-productive to efforts to strike
a fair balance between state and Indian claims. State legal campaigns
against the Indians do not encourage quantification or compromise and
they have not, despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's efforts, removed the great
cloud that threatens the enjoyment of existing and future rights.
In the future, the emphasis should be on cutting fair deals with the
Indians. The Fort Peck Compact and the Colorado-Ute Settlement suggest some guidelines that should be applied to future settlements, although
other guidelines must be added in the name of fairness. Negotiation will
not be easy. States must first confront different factions within the tribes
and then the different definitions of federal Indian interests that exist
within the federal government. The real issue in these negotiations is
generally how much it will cost to bring water to the Indians. The BIA,
the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) each have a say and each have a different perspective. For example, standards for the evaluation of Indian irrigation projects have long
been debated. The Department of the Interior has sometimes applied
higher standards to Indian projects, 22' but in other settings the BIA has
proposed more generous settlements compared to OMB.
These qualifications aside, the criteria for judging state-Indian settlements include:
First, states should assume the responsibility for the satisfaction of
Indian water rights.
Second, Indian water rights should have the same margin of surplus
that the state rights have long enjoyed. Indians should not be pressured
to put their entitlements to immediate uses but should be guaranteed sufficient quantities of water for future tribal needs. Interim leases to nonIndian users should minimize the disruption of existing water uses.
Third, states ought to view Indian water uses as an integral element
of state water policy and, whenever possible, recognize Indian claims, such
as instream uses, that coincide with state allocations. Tribes may not be
receptive to the integration of tribal with state water policies out of a fear
that future uses or administrative options will be prejudiced. However,
as states begin to confront issues such as the need for more efficient use
219. Id. III A.2 f. (ii):

220. See Burness, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, United States Reclamation Policy
and Indian WaterRights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 807 (1980); Burness, Cummings, Gorman
& Landsford, The "New" Arizona v. California: PracticablyIrrigableAcreage and Economic
Feasibility,22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517 (1982); Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, Practicably
IrrigatedAcreage and Economic Feasibility:The Role of Time, Ethics, and Discounting,
23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 289 (1983).
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practices and the need for the dedication of more water to instream flow
maintenance, tribes must participate in the fundamental rethinking of
Western water law and policy that is now underway.
Fourth, agreements should be viewed as a pre-condition for the establishment of a market. All Indian water rights-subject to tribal and
Department of Interior guidelines-should be presumed to be freely transferable for all productive uses unless there is a strong reason to restrict
transfer. At the present time, there is vastly more Indian water potentially open to lease than there are lessees, but the principle should
nonetheless hold.
Fifth, the focus of settlements that promise water ought to be on the
development of projects or water use options that have substantial
likelihood of improving the economic status of the tribe. The reservation
use of any substantial amount will require federal and state subsidy.
Agreements ought to be negotiated with this possibility in mind and
should be subject to adjustment if federal and state funding for a particular project does not occur.
Sixth, neither states nor tribes should be wedded to the practicably
22
irrigable acreage standard. Its chief virtue-certainty -has benefited
neither the Indians nor the states. Today's major justification for the standard is it allows the leasing of water to non-Indian lessees. However, this
is largely a false hope for the tribes. Consideration needs to be given to
solutions that may guarantee less acre feet (instream flows aside) in return
for a greater possibility of tribal benefit.

221. Arizona v. California II, 460 U.S. 605, 657 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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